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ABSTRACT
This dissertation is comprised of three papers that analyze the relationship be-
tween political money, elite interests and policies. Individual papers in this work are
connected through this overarching theme and the methodology that is used. Each
paper employs statistical methods on large-scale datasets with an emphasis on net-
work analysis. The first paper investigates the relationship between the strength of
elite connections and the success of renewable energy and emission reduction policies.
Based on an original dataset created from social media accounts of the ministers in
34 countries, this analysis uses a stochastic block model and modularity analysis to
compare the strength of connections between different types of elites. The quantita-
tive analysis is complemented by in-depth interviews conducted in seven European
countries. The second paper explores the relationship between socio-political capi-
tal of state-level American politicians and their agenda holding power in legislation.
Using a very extensive dataset on campaign contribution records and state-level bill
proposals in the United States, this paper employs survival analysis to explore the
aforementioned connection. The third paper is a quantitative description of the large
datasets on federal- and state-level campaign contribution records and state-level bill
v
proposals. Using visualization, network analysis, and clustering, the last part of the
dissertation uncovers some of the connections between big political donors, parties,
private sector, and legislation. The last paper in the dissertation also contains a typo-
logical identification section for donors and lawmakers. The goal of the dissertation
is to expand the literature on elites, to explore what new stories can be told about
political money in the United States, and to make use of large-scale datasets for more
conclusive arguments in American politics and policy literature.
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1Chapter 1
Introduction
This dissertation brings three different topics together under the umbrella of the pol-
icymaking literature. The analysis looks at the following: the effects of connections
between elites on policymaking in renewable energy and CO2 emissions, the relation-
ship between campaign donors and the agenda holding power in state legislatures,
and the identification of groups of campaign contributors and state-level politicans in
the US. Money flows from an actor to another, but individual interests also flow and
change their shapes according to the interests of others.
The motivation behind this work was the identification of underanalyzed areas
and underutilized data in the literature. First of all, social media as a cultural phe-
nomenon and also as a data source has been exponentially growing since the late
2000s. Many political scientists have been growingly involved in this topic; yet, there
is still significant potential for contribution. Second, renewable energy and CO2 pol-
icy literature is highly understudied in political science. Very few examples in this
field has so far made use of social media. The reasons behind these two phenom-
ena are the relatively new emergence of these topics as word of mouth in intellectual
circles and the newly emerging opportunities on collecting extensive data.
Third, as widely acknowledged by experts in American politics, state politics in
the US is a highly unexplored territory. Most of the work done in American politics
revolves around federal politics and the presidency. The most important factor behind
this is that US politics is quite heterogeneous with states having many different
2mechanisms, regulations, and policies. This dissertation attempts to overcome this
problem with an extensive data collection.
Lastly, the great extent of typological identification attempts in political science
have so far been heavily focused on using qualitative approaches. This dissertation
also aims to contribute to the field by making an attempt to use network analysis
and clustering.
For the major part of its existence, political science heavily relied on qualitative
approaches. Quantitative analysis has started to gain popularity after the second
half of the 1990s, but most importantly in the 2000s. Thus, as the great extent of
recently produced political science literature does, this dissertation is also an attempt
to reinforce the quantitative tradition in political science. An approach to measure
elite power, the extensive collection of social media, campaign contribution and leg-
islation data, and the application of network analysis and machine learning are the
key analytical components of this work.
There is also strong potential for interdisciplinary work between political science,
public policy, and computational sciences. In fact, the recent development of “data
science” as a field of study has given opportunity to political science and public policy
scholars to make use of computational methods more regularly and comfortably; but,
it also gave computer scientists new datasets on which newly developed tools and
algorithms can be tested, and applications on social data can be commercialized. In
this regard, this work can be regarded as a contribution to this field by strongly
relying on “big data”.
3Chapter 2
The Influence of Elite Networks on Green
Policymaking
Abstract
This paper analyzes the relationship between the policy networks and the success of
renewable energy and emission reduction policies. Arguing that strong connections be-
tween typologically different groups of elites are essential for good policies, the analysis
looks at the Twitter community structure of the ministers of 34 countries. The re-
sults of the network study indicate that the the relationship between community struc-
ture and renewable energy and CO2 emission reduction policies is similar. Looser
intra-community structures and an abundance of socially less powerful politicians are
related with higher renewable energy consumption and also lower CO2 levels, and
possibly with better policies. A case study on seven Nordic and Northern European
countries complements and reinforces the theoretical expectations about deliberative
policymaking.
2.1 Introduction
The need to create networks to respond to the requirements of your job is part of
almost every profession, but more so of politics. Politicians need to first get elected
and then reelected by convincing others through issue-seeking coalitions or rendering
them democratically ineffective by forming a coalition from like-minded people. In
4the realm of political networks, politicians are in a continuous sender and receiver
relationship with other fellow politicians and the remaining ruling elite who partici-
pate in governance directly and indirectly. This elite consists of academics, experts
working for NGOs, bureaucrats, political advisors, and high-level private executives.
This study focuses on the influence of energy and environment policy networks
on creating policies in 34 countries around the world. Special attention is paid to
Scandinavia and Northern Europe by providing a case study on the region based on
a collection of interviews that emerged from fieldwork. Specifically, the study asks
the following question: how do the structures of elite networks influence the success
of renewable energy and climate change policies? The paper uses network analysis,
regression and elite interviews to uncover the complex nature of relationships between
elites.
The analysis starts with the assumption that actors in the policymaking arena are
interdependent and the implementation of successful policies is only possible through
deliberative input of a multitude of actors from different backgrounds. Connections
are created by frequent exchanges of thoughts and opinions, as well as friendships in
formal and informal settings, both physical and online through social media (Twitter).
Social media is believed to be a good approximation of the relationships in the physical
world. In fact, a British anthropologist called Robert Dunbar suggested a limit to the
number of people a person can maintain social relationships with. Dunbar indicated
that an average person can at most know 150 people with whom he/she ”would not
feel embarrassed about joining uninvited for a drink if [he/she] happened to bump into
them in a bar” (Dunbar, 1998). Since we know that ministers would closely know a
much higher number of people than an average person, the average number of around
500 friends for a minister in the dataset appears to be a realistic number of people
they may know in real life. Being an elite means being influential on others - especially
5politicians who are in charge of changing policies; thus, it does not necessarily require
a formal entitlement in the government.
The remaining part of the paper is structured as follows. Following a section on
the definition of policy networks and elites as used in the paper, an overview of the
policy network literature, as well as the hypotheses are provided. The introductory
part is followed by data and methodology sections, the demonstration of quantitative
findings and a detailed discussion on the results of the elite interviews.
2.2 Policy Networks and Elites in the Literature
From the perspective of this analysis, policy networks constitute a subcategory of
political networks. In the latter one, ties between members of the networks are con-
structed unintentionally and also purposefully to influence the outcome of bills that
pass through local and federal level legislation. Policy networks are thought to be
formed mostly following a collective benefit calculation, rather than an individualistic
calculation of personal benefits. Policy networks can be seen as a typology of interest
intermediation versus a specific form of governance (Borzel, 1997). Adam and Kriesi
(2007) indicate that policymaking is intrinsically a process involving a diversity of
actors who are mutually interdependent. Policy networks are different from the gov-
ernance networks in the sense that they react against the idea of a monolithic state
that controls the process of policymaking alone (Blanco et al., 2011) and they are
not a post-modernist phenomenon. They may change over decades due to changes in
institutional paradigms and types of elites; however they have always been existent
since the proliferation of pluralist democracies. This study embraces the collective,
mutually interdependent, and less state-centric perspectives found in the policy net-
work literature.
Elites constitute another key aspect of this research. Philip Leifeld (2007) identi-
6fies three schools of thought in the elite networks literature. First, power elite model
represented by academics such as Dye (1986), Hunter (1953), Mills (1956), and Higley
and Moore (1981) argues that there is a clear hierarchy of power and influence among
elite groups with business, political, and perhaps military elites located at its apex.
Other actors like legislators, top civil servants, media, academics, or trade union
leaders are peripheral. This model is especially favored by Marxist and Neo-Marxist
approaches that investigate class relations. Second, Dahls (1961) pluralist elite model
provides a decentralized view on elite networks rejects the core-periphery structure
and the persistency of relations and proposes prominence that comes from relations as
the driving factor in shaping the network structure. Third, the idea of the inner circle
of tightly connected elites was proposed by Useem (1984). In his work, Useem talks
about a well-connected set of directors and corporations able to communicate and
act upon the political interests of big business. Corporate political action is stronger
than the action of individual elites. Taking different branches in the literature into
consideration, this analysis could be considered a neo-Marxist and pluralist model
at the same time, in which the relations are not persistent but flexible. There is a
temporally limited hierarchy between actors in the model with politicians having the
upper hand in the network, since they control the decision mechanism. The influence
of elites on other elites is much more impactful and sharper than the potential impact
of masses in policymaking.
Furthermore, this study assumes that the exchange between elites in the model
is limited to information. The connections do not involve other rationales or benefits
that have also been studied in the literature, such as money, staff or services exchange,
being allies with other elites, or to form relationships with influential actors to control
critical resources (Weible and Sabetier, 2005).
72.3 Policy Network Analysis and Elite Networks Literature
Political network analysis has come into being in the 1970s, and started to flourish
in the 1990s. The literature has developed in the direction of quantitative studies,
but the qualitative branch of the literature is quite strong, as well. As Kuhn (1962)
argues in his work about scientific revolutions, network analysis has been growing
exponentially in the 1960s and 1970s, and currently it seems to be in the middle
stage of this exponential growth.
This is a study that looks at the formation of policy networks through the contri-
bution of elites. Policy networks and elites are very flexibly defined in the literature,
and research in this field makes use of these terms in a way that is useful for researcher.
In a nutshell, all policy networks can be regarded as structures or patterns of resource
exchange (Marsh 1998). In this sense, this paper has no different approach–in fact,
one should revere works especially in this branch of political science that have a
goal to detect and report on distinct perspectives (Philip Leifelds thesis on policy
networks is a good example). Leifeld indicates that it is possible to cluster policy
network research in four groups in terms of research design, topic, use of methods
and some other characteristics, which he calls exchange cluster, governance cluster,
elite cluster, and participation cluster.
The concept of policy networks has been extensively discussed in the 2000s, and
there seems to be a strong divide between the Anglo-Saxon network literature and
German contributions (Jordan and Schubert, 1992; Rhodes and Marsh, 1992; van
Waarden, 1992). Borzel argues that the Anglo-Saxon research tradition is predom-
inantly concerned with modeling different state-society relations, whereas ”German
literature tends to treat policy networks as an alternative form of governance to hi-
erarchy and market”. English/American literature mainly focuses on the interest
intermediation part of network formations, whereas the German school is more inter-
8ested in governance (Borzel, 1997).
It is also important to talk about the various processes that form the connec-
tions between the members of a network. The connections can be formed formally
and informally. In this regard, Schneider and Jannings (2006) article on sociological
exchange theory correctly underlines the importance of relational approaches as one
form of policy analysis. Formal connections would include sessions in the parliament,
gatherings in state organizations for the purpose of discussing policies, formal reports
and analysis sent to politicians by bureaucrats and researchers working for the state.
Informal connections, on the other hand, could be more personal and spontaneous in
nature, take place in physical and non-physical settings, and in addition to public, be
in private circumstances. For instance, a meeting between a bureaucrat and member
of the parliament in a cafe or a tweeting and retweeting activity between two people
on Twitter would constitute an informal connection. This research assumes that,
for the case of policymaking, informal connections matter as much as formal connec-
tions and possibly even more, since the treatment (that is, the exchange of thoughts)
can be projected in a more direct and sharp way isolated from external confounders.
For that matter, this paper is in the exchange cluster school mentioned by Leifeld,
in which case the literature frequently focuses on national policies and the relations
that are analyzed are social exchange processes.
Another issue to consider is the level of hierarchy in the network, the amount of
network power each actor possesses. Politicians appear to be more powerful members
of the elite networks, since they have the final say on the bills proposed for approval in
the parliament. Coleman (1986, 1990) argues that the policy network is a marketplace
where purchasing power is equivalent to an actor’s ability to control events is quite
accurate. Coleman indicates that an actor’s “purchasing power in the marketplace”
is determined by his/her initial configuration – the number of people this person is
9connected to and can influence – and the equilibrium resulting from political exchange.
The facilitator (and the platform in formal exchanges) of this network is the state,
and most importantly the government.
As Konig (1998) indicates, “[network studies] have neither explained why private
and public actors are mutually dependent, whether their dependency is restricted to
the boundaries of specific subsystems and how this dependency affects public decision
making”. Also in this case, using a network comprised of politicians and their friends
(most of whom are non-politicians), this study will test whether there is a credible
connection between network features and the success of policies.
Methodologically, network analysis is quite rich in quantitative and qualitative
analysis, and not so prevalent in mixed-methods studies. Quantitative approaches
consider network analysis as a method of social structure analysis and look at the
cohesion between and the spatial representation of actors. Qualitative approaches,
on the other hand, are more process and content-oriented and less structure-focused
(Borzel, 1997). In this regard, this study aims to enrich the literature through a
mixed-methods contribution.
2.4 Social Media and Green Policy Networks Literature
There is substantive research in the field of renewable energy, environment, and so-
cial media, as well. Jenner et al. (2012) indicate that actors who are affected by
the renewable energy promotion policies in the EU countries will try to influence
the policy-making process according to their own preferences. Policymakers have
the obligation to provide public goods, such as employment and energy, which cre-
ates a network between interest groups, citizens, and the government. Markard et
al. (2012) look at the advocacy coalitions in Swiss energy policy by analyzing the
energy transition discourses after the Fukushima disaster. They believe that such
10
coalitions/networks are a precondition for major policy change and consider polit-
ical parties, associations, environmental NGOs, and firms as the key stakeholders.
Examples of network studies in the energy field include different groups of actors
struggling to legitimize and delegitimize nuclear power (Garud et al. 2010; Geels
and Verhees, 2011) and to influence nuclear policy making (Nohrstedt, 2010), as well.
Similar academic concerns have been reported for renewable energy policies with in-
cumbent actors trying to prevent policy change and renewable energy proponents
lobbying in favor of deployment policies (Hess, 2014; Shlsen and Hisschemller, 2014).
Ingold and Fischer (2014), similarly talk about Swiss climate policy making, where
they investigate the collaboration between actors using social network analysis and
a stochastic actor-oriented model. Markard et al. (2012) indicate that policy change
is explained in the literature by using different frameworks, such as institutional ra-
tional choice, punctuated-equilibrium theory, and the advocacy coalitions framework.
In the latter one, policy participants are legislators, agency officials, interest group
leaders, researchers, and journalists (Sabatier and Weible, 2007), which fits well into
the framework of this paper.
Twitter has recently been frequently used for social network analysis by political
scientists and computer scientists who are willing to take advantage of the big social
data online. It is very common to see big data projects, where authors collect hundreds
of thousands or millions of user profiles and the tweets of these users to discover
general patterns in some social phenomena. One example is by Takhteyev et al.
(2012) where the authors look at the geography of Twitter networks and argue that the
frequency of airlines flights between two locations is the best predictor of Twitter ties.
Since 2006, when Twitter became a successful social media platform, microblogging
became part of the political discourse online (Welpe et al., 2009). Other studies
examine particular cases, such as political protests or uprisings, in which Twitter has
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been used extensively (such as by Varol et al. (2014) focusing on the Gezi Protests in
Istanbul). Similarly, Bruns and Highfield (2012) looked at the political campaigning
patterns on Twitter during the 2012 Queensland State Election in Australia.
Honeycutt and Herring (2009) and Boyd et al. (2010) argue that Twitter is
being used for collaboration and conversations despite being originally designed as a
broadcasting platform for diffusing information. Social media was among the tools
used by local activists, but also attracted comments from a worldwide media audience
(Bruns and Liang, 2012). In their interesting work, titled German Politicians and
Their Twitter Networks, Plotkowiak et al. (2013) present an analysis of 599 Twitter
accounts of politicians, who for the first time became involved in social networking,
becoming their own reputational entrepreneurs in social media. The analysis of the
network shows that the majority of connections were established between members
of the same party and the majority of Tweets are directed towards the members of
the same political fraction. Bundestag Twitter sphere mirrors the structure of the
political field by creating highly clustered communication structures (ibid.).
2.5 Research Questions
This paper measures the success of policies by the outcome (level of renewable energy
consumption and the CO2 emissions) and investigates the following hypotheses:
H1: Strongly connected elite networks with high local density of communication
leads to more successful policies.
H2: The distribution of social media power among elites affects renewable energy
and climate change policies differently.
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2.6 Data
The analysis includes 34 countries1 and uses the dataset collected by Williams and
Seki (2017) that looks at minister-specific variables2 in various countries.
The paper uses social network data along with economic and energy-specific vari-
ables in a regression framework. The explanatory variables are listed below. These
variables have been chosen following certain scientific preferences from the literature
that mostly look at social, economic, and demographic factors and that may influence
renewable energy production together with policy choices. For these variables, an av-
erage of the values between the years 2007-2017 was taken, since this corresponds to
the timeframe when Twitter was active as a social media network:
1. Twitter data on ministers and their friends on Twitter was downloaded using
a scraping code. This data was used to create social networks of ministers-to-
ministers and ministers-to-friends (bipartite networks) and from that various
network variables have been extracted that will more closely be explained in
the methodology section.
2. Agriculture, industry, and services as share of GDP (World Bank 2017). The
composition of the economy may significantly affect the choice of investment
into green technologies.
3. Domestic credit to private sector as share of GDP (ibid.). The financial op-
portunities provided to domestic energy producers may have an influence on
renewable energy production.
1There are 29 countries from Europe and the rest of the countries are from the developed world.
The following countries are in the list: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Czech Repub-
lic, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Great Britain, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel,
Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland,
Portugal, Romania, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United States.
2These variables include functions of ministers, the duration of their service, their political party,
and the political spectrum of their political identity along with other demographic information.
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4. Population density (ibid.). Since population density is needed to make capital-
heavy investments, countries with higher population densities may find it easier
to invest in green technologies.
5. Energy intensity per unit of energy (ibid.) and CO2 intensity per unit of energy
consumed (ibid.). Economies with heavy energy users may have different energy
needs and may use conventional energy sources more intensively.
6. Renewable energy consumption (as share of total primary energy consumption)
and CO2 emissions per capita (ibid.). Since countries have different starting
points in renewable energy production and CO2 emission reduction, it may be
useful to control for those values.
The outcome variables are the following:
1. Average renewable energy consumption as percentage of final energy in the last
10 and 5 years.3
2. Average CO2 emissions (metric tons per capita) in the last 10 and 5 years.
As mentioned, the data for the case study comes from interviews completed in
Scandinavia and Northern Europe. In order to minimize the impact of confounders
on the hypothesized causal relationship, countries that have relatively similar cul-
tural backgrounds, socio-economic characteristics and sizes of population with sim-
ilar amounts of renewable energy endowment due to geographical proximity have
been taken into consideration. Specifically, a comparison between Sweden, Denmark,
Norway, Iceland, Ireland, Belgium, and the Netherlands is provided.
3Since some social media accounts may have been created much later than the first year Twitter
was founded, two different calculations of outcome variables have been taken into consideration.
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2.7 Methodology and Descriptive Statistics
In this section, the data calculation procedure and methodology is explained more
closely. The selection of data and methodologies are based on a number of assump-
tions. First, because of the complex nature of policies, formulation of the policy
networks for renewable energy and CO2 emission reduction can be approximated us-
ing a large body of ministers. Second, connections on social media are quite similar
to the connections in the physical world. This is especially true for people followed by
ministers on social media. People who are not physically connected to ministers are
believed to be randomly distributed among different countries and parties. Third,
it is known that not all accounts are used by ministers themselves; however, most
of them are. It is assumed that there is no structural difference between success
and failure cases regarding Twitter account management. Fourth, it is expected that
there should be a difference between Twitter penetration among the general public
and the ministers, with ministers from different countries exhibiting comparable level
of Twitter usage.
An example of minister-to-friend (Iceland) and minister-to-minister (Ireland) net-
work is provided in Figure 1 and 2. The minister-to-friend network shows that there
is a great overlap of friends between some ministers, which reinforces the argument
of this paper that policymaking is a process based on an elite community with com-
mon connections. The second network graph that shows the connections between
ministers shows some assortativity (correlation between connections) for politicians
who belong to the same party. Similarly, an overview of Twitter data is given with
number of ministerial positions, number of unique ministers, ratio of Twitter users
among ministers and the average of other characteristic features in Table 1.
Network analysis employs two methods: a bipartite stochastic block model (biSBM)
analysis on a network that includes ministers (higher level members of the network)
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Figure 2·1: Iceland Minister-to-Friend Network
and their Twitter friends (lower level members of the network) and another SBM
analysis that looks purely at the ministers. Here, the biSBM analysis attempts to
identify the number of different clusters of people according to their connections to
ministers and the probabilities for each person in the network to be a member of any
cluster identified by the algorithm. The expectation is that success cases will have
clusters, the members of which will on average present higher probabilities to belong
16
Figure 2·2: Ireland Minister-to-Minister Network
to other clusters. Hence, it is expected that the connections between different groups
of people will be stronger in success stories.
Stochastic block model (SBM) is widely employed as a canonical method to study
clustering and community detection (Abbe, 2017). The purpose of the community
detection in a network is to partition the set of connections into groups that have
higher local density. In the most general methodological context and also the con-
17
Table 2.1: Overview of Twitter Data
#Positions #Ministers %Twitter Users #Friends #Followers #Favorites #Statuses
Denmark 306 108 66.67% 530.71 17844.28 1905.90 2523.97
Sweden 240 126 61.90% 551.33 19418.46 726.37 3047.05
France 455 209 60.77% 1382.93 118010.30 529.79 4235.59
Malta 123 45 60.00% 573.48 5305.70 1416.07 4153.63
Belgium 338 120 55.83% 903.01 21886.76 416.75 2405.84
Norway 231 132 55.30% 1879.75 25716.01 423.08 2580.26
Australia 290 104 53.85% 12995.57 111587.70 375.50 3872.79
Netherlands 185 89 50.56% 175.42 34354.78 56.58 2444.53
Luxembourg 109 51 49.02% 355.36 23831.32 325.04 1199.92
USA 267 134 48.51% 10010.62 2057193.78 302.25 2186.08
Great Britain 284 132 46.97% 949.95 64146.08 365.03 3979.27
Canada 457 179 46.37% 1698.28 28965.02 732.60 5907.34
Ireland 181 76 40.79% 894.26 14087.97 572.00 2162.00
Italy 506 264 38.26% 2124.28 115241.86 2619.99 9348.12
New Zealand 401 98 37.76% 1738.41 17120.16 3377.95 5013.24
Germany 153 90 33.33% 400.43 32452.63 269.90 1712.63
Spain 170 118 31.36% 1725.57 87151.92 1020.78 6418.32
Iceland 152 62 30.65% 100.68 913.47 286.05 208.95
Estonia 131 76 28.95% 318.27 11317.45 912.55 3178.82
Poland 501 232 26.29% 374.30 65789.41 2911.95 5859.33
Slovenia 197 104 25.96% 560.63 8176.22 695.00 3604.07
Lithuania 171 82 23.17% 311.53 17190.42 391.89 922.26
Latvia 228 94 22.34% 666.00 9227.90 2555.81 5915.33
Greece 373 188 21.28% 2077.10 33832.38 1140.40 7215.90
Czech Republic 334 180 19.44% 303.63 7786.09 494.09 1448.86
Israel 883 126 17.46% 263.45 75743.91 315.77 1721.14
Switzerland 191 23 17.39% 660.75 23957.00 99.25 516.25
Bulgaria 127 108 14.81% 617.81 16360.19 793.81 2635.56
Hungary 237 130 14.62% 69.05 6916.11 73.32 618.26
Portugal 210 113 13.27% 557.27 28051.00 244.73 1995.33
Romania 300 138 11.59% 101.94 4595.13 34.44 618.13
Slovakia 242 135 10.37% 301.14 3403.00 282.86 751.79
Austria 207 84 5.95% 573.60 57461.60 1981.40 3281.00
Japan 616 272 2.57% 195.14 168411.29 183.14 1413.57
text of this paper, community detection refers to the grouping of vertices (in this
paper, the elites) by making inferences from the similarity of their connections to
other vertices. SBM provides a probability of an edge between two nodes, and this
probability depends on which clusters those edges are in and the probability is inde-
pendent across edges. SBM uses an “integrated classification likelihood” to determine
the optimal number of clusters and calculates inter- and intra-class probabilities after
finding the degree distribution in the network. The paper looks at the ratios of inter-
and intra-class sums of connection probabilities. Since the connection probability is
highly dependent on the optimal number of clusters (which can be a number between
2 and 15 in the model used in this paper), a minister count-weighted linear regres-
sion approach has been used to lessen the effects of of using this simple statistical
approach. This method has been used to figure out how powerfully connected elite
cliques are, or how powerfully connected their clusters are to each other.
The strength of connections between members of these two types of networks was
measured using four different types of indices (a binary and three weighted networks):
1. Binary Index : Connections between members of the network is classified as
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existent or non-existent.
2. Popularity Index : Connections between two members (i and j ) of the net-
work are weighted using the following formula: log(#followers/#friends)i *
log(#followers+#friends)i * log(#followers/#friends)j * log(#followers+
#friends)j
3. Participation Index : Connections between two members (i and j ) of the network
are weighted using the following formula: log(#favorites)i * log(#statuses)i
* log(#favorites)j * log(#statuses)j
4. Total Index : the product of Popularity Index and Participation Index
The indices above have been chosen to capture three key factors for policymaking:
being connected, being an elite and being communicative. This study argues that
people should (first) be connected in order to exchange opinions, after that their
level of “eliteness” influences their capacity to be part of the policymaking process,
and they can only support or criticize policy views, if they are good communicators.
These factors have been taken into consideration with Binary Index, Popularity Index,
and Participation Index respectively. Total Index has been devised as a measure to
capture all these three factors at the same time.
As previously mentioned in the data section, the network variables were extracted
from the Twitter networks created separately for each country. Minister-to-friend
networks are represented by bipartite networks and minister-to-minister networks are
represented by networks based on adjacency matrices. Using this data, centrality
measures (degree, closeness, and betweenness) have been calculated. To look at the
distribution of social power in the network, skewness values have been calculated.
Skewness provides a measure for the asymmetry of the distribution of centrality values
in the social media network. The politician with the median social power in positively
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skewed countries has lower power than the average politician; in other words, there
are many less powerful and few very powerful politicians. In the case of negatively
skewed countries - as expected - there are few less powerful and many very powerful
politicians.
The biSBM part of the study uses binary bipartite and adjacency matrices.4 After
a dimensionality reduction process, the strengths of connections within groups, as well
as the strengths between groups is calculated. Modularity score is very similar to the
biSBM analysis5 except that it is used for weighted matrices. The modularity has
been calculated using an average of the three weighted indices explained above. The
relationship between the outcome variables (last 10 years) and the network variables
are displayed below.
As mentioned, key outcome variables in this study are the percentage of renewable
energy in final energy consumption and the metric tons of CO2 emissions per capita.
A bar graph of the most successful (highest renewables - lowest CO2) countries is
provided below.
To test the relationship between network variables and the success of policies
(the proxies for which are the renewable energy consumption and the CO2 levels), a
weighted linear regression6 is used. The results for minister-to-friend and minister-
to-minister networks are provided separately in the next section.
For the case study, an in-depth interview has been conducted with key figures in
4This part of the analysis uses the mixer package of R - this package uses a ”Bayesian cluster-
ing algorithm” that is similar to GMM. After the dimensionality reduction process, it separately
calculates the the probabilities for the members of clusters to belong to their own cluster (inside),
as well as to the other clusters (outside). The difference between the average outside and inside
probabilities is taken to calculate this variable.
5Modularity is the fraction of the edges that fall within the given groups minus the expected
fraction if edges were distributed at random. Networks with high modularity have dense connections
between the nodes within modules but sparse connections between nodes in different modules. For
this party, Newman’s modularity has been used.
6Some countries in the dataset have too few ministers on social media to provide an accurate
picture of that country, such as Japan with two ministers only. Therefore, countries with more
observations have been weighted more heavily using a normalized scale.
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Renewable Energy (% of Final Energy) CO2 (Metric Tons Per Capita)
Figure 2·3: Average Skewness and Outcome Variables
the renewable energy and environment field. According to the statements and exam-
ples provided by the actors, the strength of the connections between different groups
of experts has been determined. The list of interviewees and the set of questions can
be found in the Appendix.
2.8 Results
The quantitative findings of the study indicate that network effects between policy-
makers are significant factors that may influence the development of renewable energy
and the reduction of C02 emissions controlling for a set of background factors. The
results also show that the mechanism works similarly for renewable energy and CO2
emissions. Since the explanatory power of the network variables are quite small and
hence can possible be captured by other variables, without the controls, the relation-
ship between network and outcome variables is not significant for any of the models.
The first three models represent the averages for the last 10 years, whereas the last
three models represent the averages for the last 5 years. The results for renewable
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Renewable Energy (% of Final Energy) CO2 (Metric Tons Per Capita)
Figure 2·4: Average Inside vs. Outside Connection Probabilities and
Outcome Variables
energy and CO2 emissions are provided in the next two pages.
Table 2.2: Renewable Energy Full Model - All Friends
Renewable Energy
Last 10 Years Last 5 Years
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Intra- and inter-module prob. 71.372 85.426∗
(45.297) (47.706)
Average modularity −41.756∗∗ −45.770∗∗
(19.825) (21.056)
Average skewness −4.010∗∗ −4.164∗∗
(1.471) (1.583)
Dom. credit to priv. sector 0.048 0.080∗ 0.071∗ 0.053 0.089∗ 0.078∗
(0.044) (0.044) (0.041) (0.047) (0.047) (0.044)
GDP per capita −0.0002∗ −0.0002∗∗ −0.0002∗ −0.0002∗ −0.0002∗∗ −0.0002∗
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
FDI, net inflows 0.301 0.311 0.240 0.269 0.288 0.218
(0.205) (0.195) (0.190) (0.216) (0.207) (0.204)
Population density per sq. km −0.022 −0.023 −0.020 −0.021 −0.022 −0.020
(0.015) (0.014) (0.013) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015)
Energy intensity 1.498∗ 1.310∗ 0.931 1.423 1.190 0.792
(0.797) (0.752) (0.722) (0.840) (0.799) (0.777)
CO2 intensity −14.405∗∗∗ −14.973∗∗∗ −16.313∗∗∗ −14.380∗∗∗ −15.145∗∗∗ −16.586∗∗∗
(3.180) (2.971) (2.805) (3.349) (3.155) (3.019)
Energy imports −0.063∗∗∗ −0.067∗∗∗ −0.067∗∗∗ −0.061∗∗∗ −0.064∗∗∗ −0.064∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013)
Constant 41.194∗∗∗ 70.024∗∗∗ 64.932∗∗∗ 42.171∗∗∗ 74.732∗∗∗ 68.328∗∗∗
(13.222) (14.589) (11.987) (13.925) (15.495) (12.902)
Observations 34 34 34 34 34 34
R2 0.798 0.812 0.830 0.780 0.792 0.806
Adjusted R2 0.731 0.750 0.774 0.707 0.722 0.742
Residual Std. Error (df = 24) 6.416 6.192 5.889 6.758 6.577 6.339
F Statistic (df = 8; 24) 11.887∗∗∗ 12.985∗∗∗ 14.671∗∗∗ 10.640∗∗∗ 11.401∗∗∗ 12.501∗∗∗
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
The regression results provided in Table 2 and Table 3 demonstrate that the re-
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Figure 2·5: Average Modularity and Outcome Variables
Table 2.3: CO2 Emissions Full Model - All Friends
CO2 Emissions
Last 10 Years Last 5 Years
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Intra- and inter-module prob. −39.980∗∗ −37.684∗∗
(17.406) (17.016)
Average modularity 16.577∗ 16.092∗
(8.339) (8.103)
Average skewness 0.822 0.731
(0.686) (0.669)
Domestic credit to private sector 0.003 −0.011 −0.004 0.001 −0.012 −0.004
(0.018) (0.019) (0.019) (0.017) (0.018) (0.019)
GDP per capita 0.0001∗∗ 0.0001∗∗ 0.0001∗ 0.0001∗∗ 0.0001∗∗ 0.0001
(0.00004) (0.00004) (0.00004) (0.00004) (0.00004) (0.00004)
FDI, net inflows 0.154∗ 0.148∗ 0.162∗ 0.146∗ 0.141∗ 0.152∗
(0.075) (0.077) (0.083) (0.073) (0.074) (0.081)
Population density per sq. km −0.012∗∗ −0.011∗ −0.011∗ −0.011∗ −0.010∗ −0.010∗
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Energy intensity 0.181 0.246 0.288 0.207 0.268 0.305
(0.277) (0.282) (0.298) (0.271) (0.274) (0.291)
Energy imports 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.00000 0.001 −0.0003
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Constant 7.667∗∗ −3.931 2.162 7.471∗∗ −3.706 2.420
(3.124) (5.263) (3.752) (3.053) (5.114) (3.662)
Observations 34 34 34 34 34 34
R2 0.495 0.472 0.422 0.463 0.445 0.386
Adjusted R2 0.354 0.324 0.260 0.312 0.289 0.215
Residual Std. Error (df = 25) 2.571 2.629 2.751 2.513 2.554 2.685
F Statistic (df = 7; 25) 3.501∗∗∗ 3.192∗∗ 2.605∗∗ 3.074∗∗ 2.861∗∗ 2.250∗
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
lational mechanism for renewable energy and CO2 emissions work similarly. The
biSBM variable for binary matrices and the average modularity scores favor higher
inter-community strength for the consumption of higher amounts of renewable energy
and lower amounts of CO2 emissions. The coefficient for the binary network and the
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Figure 2·6: Outcome Variables - Top 10 Countries
weighted networks have the same direction. Skewness does not seem to matter for
CO2 emissions, but negative skewness (a social media network with many powerful
players corresponds to more renewable energy consumption). Control variables fre-
quently mentioned in the literature, such as domestic credit, GDP per capita, FDI,
and population density are either not significant or do not seem to have considerable
power to influence outcome variables because of their magnitude.
To further investigate this relationship, same analysis has been performed on
minister-to-minister networks (Table 4). Results are given in the next page7.
As seen with the insignificant network variables in the minister-to-minister net-
work, the larger minister-to-friend network seems to be a more relevant model in
explaining the theory that policy networks are created with the input of larger seg-
7Average skewness has not been calculated for the minister-to-minister networks, since looking
at the distribution of centralities only makes sense for larger set of observations and some minister-
to-minister networks are significantly small. In addition, five countries have been excluded from the
minister-only data, since these countries have fewer than 5 ministers on Twitter and therefore do
not seem to offer an accurate picture of the relationships between their politicians.
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Table 2.4: Renewable Energy Full Model - Ministers Only
Renewable Energy
Last 10 Years Last 5 Years
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Intra- and inter-module prob. 17.640 19.197
(20.627) (22.101)
Average modularity −36.422 −41.984
(24.631) (26.121)
Domestic credit to private sector 0.046 0.062 0.053 0.070
(0.054) (0.050) (0.057) (0.053)
GDP per capita −0.0001 −0.0002∗ −0.0001 −0.0002∗
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001)
FDI, net inflows 0.308 0.269 0.279 0.227
(0.252) (0.235) (0.270) (0.249)
Population density per sq. km −0.022 −0.021 −0.021 −0.020
(0.018) (0.017) (0.020) (0.018)
Energy intensity 1.649 1.616∗ 1.555 1.552
(1.005) (0.895) (1.077) (0.950)
CO2 intensity −16.356∗∗∗ −15.361∗∗∗ −16.628∗∗∗ −15.492∗∗∗
(3.730) (3.396) (3.997) (3.601)
Energy imports −0.062∗∗∗ −0.054∗∗∗ −0.059∗∗∗ −0.050∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016)
Constant 49.109∗∗∗ 56.852∗∗∗ 51.395∗∗∗ 60.026∗∗∗
(14.924) (14.230) (15.990) (15.091)
Observations 27 29 27 29
R2 0.795 0.803 0.768 0.781
Adjusted R2 0.704 0.724 0.665 0.694
Residual Std. Error 7.446 (df = 18) 6.944 (df = 20) 7.978 (df = 18) 7.364 (df = 20)
F Statistic 8.718∗∗∗ 10.163∗∗∗ 7.442∗∗∗ 8.928∗∗∗
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
ments of the society.
The graphs for marginal effects of the three key independent variables have been
provided below. As observed from the regression results above, there is little difference
between aggregated values for the last 10 and 5 years. In the case of renewable
energy, one can see that the SBM variable does not do a good job of predicting the
production differences, as seen with the large confidence interval around the trend line.
Modularity and skewness, however, statistically significantly explain the differences
between countries: when a country goes from a modularity value of -1 to 1 (the edge
cases), this corresponds to producing around 80% less renewable energy. Thus, more
strongly clustered elite structures correspond to fewer amounts of renewable energy
production. Skewness is harder to interpret; yet, going from a normally distributed
set of social power values to distributions where only few politicians hold the social
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Table 2.5: CO2 Emissions Full Model - Ministers Only
CO2 Emissions
Last 10 Years Last 5 Years
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Intra- and inter-module prob. 9.187 8.058
(8.268) (8.120)
Average modularity 16.577∗ 16.092∗
(8.339) (8.103)
Domestic credit to private sector −0.004 −0.011 −0.005 −0.012
(0.022) (0.019) (0.022) (0.018)
GDP per capita 0.0001∗ 0.0001∗∗ 0.0001∗ 0.0001∗∗
(0.0001) (0.00004) (0.0001) (0.00004)
FDI, net inflows 0.078 0.148∗ 0.079 0.141∗
(0.100) (0.077) (0.098) (0.074)
Population density per sq. km −0.006 −0.011∗ −0.006 −0.010∗
(0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006)
Energy intensity 0.408 0.246 0.408 0.268
(0.386) (0.282) (0.379) (0.274)
CO2 intensity 0.001 0.002 −0.0002 0.001
(0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005)
Energy imports 3.428 −3.931 3.698 −3.706
(4.094) (5.263) (4.021) (5.114)
Observations 27 34 27 34
R2 0.417 0.472 0.376 0.445
Adjusted R2 0.203 0.324 0.147 0.289
Residual Std. Error 3.061 (df = 19) 2.629 (df = 25) 3.006 (df = 19) 2.554 (df = 25)
F Statistic 1.945 3.192∗∗ 1.638 2.861∗∗
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
power decreases the renewable energy production. The relationship between network
variables and CO2 emission values is similar. Here, going from a completely non-
modular to a modular network decreases the CO2 emissions per capita by around 30
metric tons. Similarly, the marginal effect for SBM network variable and skewness
has the opposite direction.
2.9 Case Study: A Comparative Look at Nordic Region and
Northern Europe
This short overview of the fieldwork undertaken in the Nordic region of Europe (Swe-
den, Norway, Denmark, Iceland) and Northern Europe (Ireland, Belgium, the Nether-
lands) reinforces the finding that successful policies are based on stronger connections
between people of different professional typologies. With higher renewable energy con-
sumption and lower CO2 emissions, the Nordic region constitutes the successful set of
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Marginal Effects, Last 10 Years
Marginal Effects, Last 5 Years
Figure 2·7: Renewable Energy Production, Marginal Effects
countries in the dataset, whereas the Northern Europe is less successful. An overview
of the renewable energy and emission figures, as well as a list of the interviewees can
be found in the Appendix.
For the fieldwork, an in-depth interview technique has been applied. The intervie-
wees have been asked questions about their background and education to determine
whether there is an entry barrier to be connected to other elites, and the nature
of their connections to various types of elites. The set of questions on the connec-
tions were directed at understanding the type (formal or informal) of connections,
the perception of interviewees about who dominates the conversation, and the formal
or informal events that the interviewee participates with other elites. Similarly, an
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Marginal Effects, Last 10 Years
Marginal Effects, Last 5 Years
Figure 2·8: CO2 Emissions, Marginal Effects
effort has been made to understand how politicized the nature of connections, the
bureaucracy, and the institutions are in general. The last major goal of the in-depth
interviews was to understand the hierarchy of the relationships among elites.
The success cases have a few commonalities that could be the determinants of their
performance. First, as expected, the connections between elites in these countries
seem to be quite strong, especially in the academy, politics and bureaucracy triangle.
Some countries, such as Sweden, seem to be internationally better connected. Sur-
prisingly, however, connections to companies are on a mediocre level, which may be
due to social democratic political history of most of those countries in the 1990s and
the 2000s. Due to a political culture of tolerance and cooperation, there is an effort
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for understanding for the other in the political platform. The strength of connections
is positively influenced by the stability of the bureaucracy, which seems to consti-
tute an indispensable and cooperative component of the government. Bureaucracy is
usually a lifelong job and bureaucrats are respected by politicians.
Second, the interchange between different types of elites seems to be quite strong
in the success cases. In fact, some of the interviewees used to be different types of
elites in the past. For instance, Yvonne Fredriksson is a good example, as she worked
as an MP, later as a bureaucrat, and currently as a consultant.
Third, the level of formality in of relations between elites seemed to be relatively
low in success cases. This is especially apparent in the case of yearly summer meetings
that three of the success cases (Sweden, Norway, and Denmark) organize at the end
of each business/political year.
The failure cases show a greater amount of variation in terms of the strength of
connections. The elites in elite are quite isolated, whereas the Netherlands can be
compared to one of the success cases. Nevertheless, looking at two groups of countries
as a whole, certain differences cannot be missed.
First, the types of relationships in failure cases seem to be more formal than in
the success cases. In none of the interviews in those countries, elites indicated that
they are connected to other potential elites on a personal or friendship level. A
good example of this is that there is no yearly semi-formal gathering for any of those
countries that brings together all stakeholders as there is in Scandinavian nations.
Second, the switch or transfer from one sector to another seems to be more unusual
and possible more difficult in failure cases. Thus, it is expected that it is harder for the
elites in those countries to be connected to people from different circles. Especially
in the long term, this can lead to a growing level of isolation.
Third, some of the relationships that seem to be quite strong in the green policy-
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Table 2.6: Overview of Fieldwork
Country Academic Political Bureaucratic Commercial International
Denmark average strong strong average average
Sweden strong strong average average strong
Norway strong strong average average average
Iceland strong strong strong average strong
Ireland weak weak average weak average
Netherlands strong strong strong average weak
Belgium average average average average average
making society can be a product of the recent times and hence not institutionalized.
A good example is the recently signed (2013) multi-party agreement in the Nether-
lands that puts different group of stakeholders as potential policy influencers on the
paper.
Countries in which the elites indicated that they have stronger connections to
people outside of their circles tend to be the ones who perform better in renewable
energy consumption or CO2 reduction. An overview of connections to different groups
of actors is presented below. Green represents strong connections, gray mediocre
strength and red stands for weak connections. Among the failure cases, Ireland and
Belgium clearly had weaker connections overall, but the Netherlands emerges as an
exception.
Table 1.6 provides an overview of the fieldwork. Individual cells represent the
strength of the connections.
2.10 Discussion
As hypothesized, this study confirms the expectation that it is more likely for countries
with strong connections between different types of experts to have better success in
renewable energy. As the biSBM model with binary networks and the modularity
scores with weighted networks indicate, communities with strong outside connections
are related with higher renewable energy production and lower CO2 emissions. This
expectation is reinforced with the results of the case study to some extent; although
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not clearly distinct from each other, Nordic countries with more successful renewable
energy policies seem to have relatively stronger connections to outside groups.
The success in green policymaking seems to come from stronger intra-community
and looser inter-community structures. Thus, it is a vertical process. The literature
on vertical and horizontal policymaking is not quite developed; especially in the case
of green policymaking, yet some indicators suggest that the policy creation mechanism
may be explained with the existing evidence from the fieldwork: there is a significant
number of renewable energy policies created in the state and/or local level, sometimes
as pilot projects. Similarly, it is much more common to find state-level renewable
energy policies that are then transferred to other states of a country through policy
diffusion (IRENA 2017). There is no comparable evidence for CO2; however, similar
mechanisms may be at work.
It is important to mention that certain network formations may lead to policy
success, but does policy success lead to the same network formations, as well? This
paper argues that this is quite unlikely, since network formation is a much more com-
plicated process that involves culture, institutions, and the political system. Hence,
the expectation of the paper is that countries with stronger intra-group connections
between clusters of elites in the field of renewable energy and/or climate change would
have similar network structures in other policy fields. Nevertheless, it is also impor-
tant to stress that the paper does not make any claim that these network structures
would lead to comparable success in other fields of policy.
The results of the study indicate that policy networks and policy clusters are still
strongly relevant concepts for analyzing the results of policies and making predictions.
As in many divisions of political science research, Twitter seems to be fruitful source
for making large observations and opening the gateway to new theories. The results
obtained give hope for applying the framework to other branches of policymaking.
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2.11 Appendix
Table 2.7: Number of Interviewees From Different Professions
MP Academic NGOExpert Bureaucrat
Energy
Investor Lobbyist Consultant Advisor Total
Iceland 2 1 3
Sweden 1 2 2 2 7
Denmark 2 1 1 4
Norway 4 1 1 6
Ireland 3 1 2 1 1 8
Netherlands 1 1 2 2 6
Belgium 3 3
Total 9 9 4 6 2 1 2 4 37
1. Andersson, Kjell, June 21, 2016.
2. Armansson, Birgir, August 15, 2016.
3. Bobeldijk, Annelies, January 11, 2017.
4. Brandel, Magnus, June 21, 2016.
5. Cahill, Brendan, December 20, 2016.
6. C¸egerek, Yasemin, January 12, 2017.
7. Comey, Bernie, December 19, 2016.
8. Diczfalusy, Bo, June 21, 2016.
9. Forsund, Finn, August 4, 2016.
10. Frederiksson, Yvonne, June 20, 2016.
11. Geudens, Tessa, January 17, 2017.
12. Gullberg, Ann Therese, August 4, 2016.
13. Haaland, Tarjei, June 27, 2016.
14. Healy, Gary, December 19, 2016.
32
15. Hjlmarsson, Eirkur, August 15, 2016.
16. Hoenkamp, Robin, January 12, 2017.
17. Hoffmann, Jesse, January 14, 2017.
18. Hultman, Martin, June 22, 2016.
19. Juliusdottir, Katrin, August 16, 2016.
20. Kall, Ann-Sofi, June 22, 2016.
21. Lawless, James, December 15, 2016.
22. Lepere, Guillaume, January 17, 2017.
23. Lerum Boasson, Elin, August 5, 2016.
24. Lombard, Tim, December 21, 2016.
25. Marien, Sebastiann, January 17, 2017.
26. Nordin, Rickard, June 20, 2016.
27. Nyborg, Karine, August 4, 2016.
28. OCallaghan, Gary, December 21, 2016.
29. Poll, Christian, June 28, 2016.
30. Pringle, Thomas, December 21, 2016.
31. Richardson, Katherine, June 29, 2016.
32. Rijn, Ruud van, January 12, 2017.
33. Schlaupitz, Holger, August 5, 2016.
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34. Torney, Diarmuid, December 19, 2016.
35. Underdal, Arild, August 5, 2016.
36. Vogt-Nielsen, Karl, June 29, 2016.
37. Westenberg, Saskia, January 11, 2017.
Background:
What did you study as an undergraduate, Masters or PhD student?
Where did you work before you did your current job?
Why did you choose your career?
Connections to academics:
What kind of connections do you have to academics in your current job?
Do you think academics influence your job?
Do you get together with them in formal events (conferences etc.)?
Do you have any informal relationships to academics? Is it common to exchange
thoughts with academics during informal events (for instance, while having a
drink with them)?
Do you think your relationship with academics is hierarchical? Does one of the
parties have a stronger influence on policy discussions?
Connections to politicians:
What kind of connections do you have to politicians?
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(If you are a politician) Do you have formal or informal connections to politicians
from parties other than yours? How is the nature of these connections?
Do you have relations with local level politicians?
Are there informal events for politicians to get together?
What do think about the education level of politicians in your country? Are
there many politicians with PhD degrees?
How big do you think are the number of politicians in your country compared
to the number of civil servants? Is one group particularly more influential than
the other group?
Connections to bureaucrats:
What kinds of connections do you have to bureaucrats?
Are bureaucrats particularly strong/weak in policymaking?
Do you think governments/new ideologies influence the thinking of bureaucrats?
Do you think bureaucrats change when a new government comes in?
Connections to companies:
What kinds of connections do you have to companies?
Do companies have a say in policymaking?
Do company executives get together with bureaucrats or elected politicians on
a regular basis?
Is it common that a company executive has informal relations with a politician
or a bureaucrat?
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Connections to people from other countries:
Do you have any connections to people from other countries?
What kind of connections do you have to people from Europe?
What kind of connections do you have to people outside of Europe?
Do you think these connections influence your work, especially in regard to
policymaking?
General view on connections:
Is it common for one type of elite to work in one sector (for instance, academia)
and switch to another sector at some point in his/her life? And then maybe
switch back again? Or for instance, for a politician to become a company
executive?
Do you think the society that you live in is hierarchical? Is your society a
horizontal or vertical society? Does it matter to have seniority or simply be
older than others? Do having certain surnames make achieving a better career
easier?
Do you have informal relationships with your colleagues on a frequent basis
where you work? (For instance, meeting outside of work hours, hanging out
together etc.)
Are there periodical events that allow you get together with the kinds of elites
that I mentioned? Are these events formal or informal, or both?
Lobbyists:
What is your view on lobbyists in your country? Are they strong? Are they
weak?
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Do you think lobbyists are influential in policymaking?
Do you think lobbying is transparent in your country?
Thoughts on renewable energy and environment policy:
Do you think your country is a success or a failure in renewable energy and
environment policy compared to other developed countries of Europe?
Is there a particular country that your country takes as a model?
Do you think your country has to learn new policy practices from other coun-
tries?
Do you think other countries in Europe can learn from your country?
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Chapter 3
The Power of Campaign Contribution
Networks in State-Level Lawmaking in
the USA
Abstract
This paper focuses on the state-level politicians in the US and investigates the connec-
tion between social power in the campaign contributions world and the agenda holding
power in the state legislatures. Testing an old proposition that money buys agenda
holding power using an innovative network analysis framework, the analysis looks at
the campaign contribution network of state-level politicians in the US formed through
campaign contributions in the 1989-2017 period. Taking advantage of an extensive
campaign records dataset, the study argues that social power in the campaign con-
tribution network only marginally affects the agenda holding power; in fact, the only
powerful measure to determine the agenda holding ability of a politician is the topic of
a bill he/she authors. The paper also highlights some of the interesting observations
on politicians and donors in the dataset that can shed light or lead to new paths of
research.
3.1 Introduction
There are different ways to influence politicians to create policies for one’s benefit.
Promising to vote and being a supporter of pluralist democracy single-handedly is
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one of them, but nowhere near as controversial as “buying them”. The mechanism
between money and political power is often portrayed or simplified as a rationalistic
and individualistic one. Thus, politicians need to position themselves in a sender-
receiver relationship with people and/or groups who can potentially finance their
political campaigns in return of certain favors. This exchange is too complex to be
simplified as a direct relationship, as frequently portrayed by the literature (Powell,
2014). The relationship between donors and politicians can more easily be portrayed
as a social network.
This paper analyzes the level of influence campaign contribution networks exert
on state-level bill proposals in the United States by using a very extensive dataset on
state-level campaign contributions, politicians and law proposals between the years
1989 and 2017. The analysis looks at over 15 million records of campaign contributions
to more than 112,000 winning politicians for over 187,000 bill proposals in the period.
Specifically, the study asks the following question: how do the network relationships
between donors and legislators affect the duration a bill stays on the agenda?1
Campaign contributions are a key component of lobbying. Actors who contribute
to campaigns - both givers and takers - are interdependent, and the bilateral relation-
ship between donors and politicians is influenced by both how much other politicians
receive from donors, as well as who receives from whom. Connections between politi-
cians are created when the same donor invests in same actors. Politicians that are
positioned in a dense hub of donor-to-politician networks are believed to have higher
socio-political power, especially in the case of lawmaking. As in other social walks
of life, lawmaking in the US requires parties to be people with strong inter-personal
relationships who have the political tools to persuade, force or coerce others to act in
a certain way, such as in the case of being an author of a bill.
1When a bill is introduced in the legislature, the agenda is set. The progression of discussion
about the bill can be prolonged when the agenda holding power of the author is high.
39
The remaining part of the paper provides a literature review on the influence of
campaign contributions in policymaking and the research questions. This introduc-
tory part is followed by data and methodology sections, and the demonstration of
quantitative findings. Finally, a detailed discussion on the significance of the results
is provided.
3.2 Lobbying Literature
This paper views lobbying and campaign contributions as inseparable. Lobbying is
the process of trying to influence public policy by those outside of the political pro-
cess (Darke, 1997). The term used for the non-profit sector is advocacy. Nevertheless,
it is hard to draw clear distinctions between the two (Reid, 2000). Thus, money
that facilitates the campaign process is un-/intentionally invested for the purposes
of lobbying by the donor. And it is the single most important channel of corporate
influence (Ansolabehere et al., 2003; Bennedsen and Feldman, 2002). The literature
classifies different means of corporate political influence using three main modeling
mechanisms: policy rent, strategic information transmission, and multiple means
models (Gregor, 2011). Policy rent models look at how money translates into po-
litical influence without setting any restrictions on how the investments should be
interpreted and operationalized. Strategic information transmission models analyze
how precisely communication motivates the politician to change the policy. And the
remaining cluster is a mixture of both. This study can be situated within the first
cluster.
The literature that investigates the motivations of lobbyists is quite rich. It offers
three views on the nature of lobbying that can be summarized as benign, rational,
and cynical. The older benign explanation is the pluralist theory developed by Robert
Dahl and David Truman. Their view is that like-minded individuals naturally come
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together in response to disturbances in the policy environment. Attaching a highly
constrained role to lobbying, this fundamentally instrumental view posits that lobby-
ing is an essential support of rather than a threat to democratic government (Lowery,
2007). Scholars in this tradition indicate that interest groups are a reelection of the
political will of the population, and even if some groups have access to more resources
than others, it is unlikely that views held by a significant number of people will re-
main unrepresented. In this benign view of the lobbying world, lobbyists are seen as
facilitators that put the constituents’ preferences into practise (ibid.).
The rational branch in the literature looks at lobbying from the transactions and
utility perspective, that is often labeled as the “profit maximizing model”. Mancur
Olson is an important representative of this literature with his work on collective
action (Olson, 1965). Thus, interest groups who have been able to solve their collective
action problem can concentrate their efforts on defending a certain argument more
successfully than other interest groups (which in fact may be focusing on an issue
related to a larger group of people in the population). The benign neo-pluralist
critiques say that the collective action problem is not as severe as Olson thought.
Leaders of organized interests employ a variety of creative means to overcome free
riding, including reliance on purposive and solidary incentives. More specifically,
Olson views lobbying as a by-product of reliance on selective incentives to overcome
free riding; yet, current lobbying may be a legacy of past instrumental lobbying, as
well. An important example is Microsoft that transformed itself from a non-political
organization to a strong lobbyist.
The third, cynical and the most recently developed perspective indicates that the
influence of interest groups in the US politics has been steadily increasing and this
leads to an overrepresentation of some interests in the Congress at the expense of
the interests of unorganized citizens. Many academics believe that lobbyists were not
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very influential in the past, but they have become very influential in recent times
(Mitchell and Munger, 1991, Schlozman and Tierney, 1986). To find evidence for this
issue, Langbein examined how interest group campaign contributions are related to
the number of minutes members spent in their offices with representatives of organized
interests. He found a strong relationship between contributions and time spent with
organized interests; in other words, money buys access (Langbein, 1986). Similarly,
Hall and Wayman confirm that organized interest groups who spend money on lobby-
ing draw to attention of politicians to issues related that concern them, and thus buy
politicians’ time (Hall and Wayman, 1990). Baumgartner and Jones believe that the
appearance and disappearance of issues on the public agenda depends significantly on
changes in policy images (the understandings or definitions of the issue) and policy
venues (the institutional settings in which the issues are considered) (Baumgartner
and Jones, 2009). Cynical theorists believe that MCs grant access when interest
groups enjoy competitive advantage over rivals in meeting congressional reelection
needs and when legislators expect the issues and circumstances that established the
competitive advantage to recur (Hansen, 1991).
In a similar sense, in terms of the game theoretic aspects of lobbying, one can
speak of exchange model and pluralist model schools. Exchange model argues that
policymakers are strongly rational and lobbying happens in a way in which the in-
terests with the largest amount of money or votes will have the most success in
buying policy outcomes. However, lobbying actually takes place in a context of vig-
orous competition for influence, and the effectiveness of lobbyists can sometimes be
overstated. These studies conclude that there is no direct link between money and
lobbying success, or lobbying activity and decision-maker behavior (Baumgartner and
Leech, 1998). As a response, the pluralist model argues that lobbying success rests
on far more subtle points - tactics and strategy - rather than energy and resources.
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Laing believes that understanding which model best describes the influence process
at any given time is often a matter of circumstances (Laing, 2015).
From the perspective of this paper, campaign contributions are important, espe-
cially because they set the agenda in the state legislatures and explore the problem of
gaining access to committee and subcommittee deliberations in political gatherings.
Interest groups provide political intelligence about the preferences of constituents and
they offer political propaganda on the performances of representatives in exchange
for serious consideration of their policy views. Comparably, members grant access to
interest groups to get reelected. Siding closely with the exchange model and the cyni-
cal view, this study argues that neither of these three branches offer a clear picture of
the world of lobbying. In fact, both citizens that are not as organized as others and
the organized interest groups could be highly effective in terms of influencing policy.
The donations coming from companies have a big role in providing direction to pol-
icymaking; however, the sum of individual contributions are usually higher than the
PAC contributions. Politicians who have to appeal to the voters working in different
sectors are certainly directed by individual contributions, as well. Nevertheless, to
test the claims of different views, individual, PAC, and total contributions have been
taken separately into consideration in the analysis section.
3.3 Policymaking Perspective
The policy perspective is purely interpreted as what governments do in this study,
and outside influence to policymaking (such as the contribution of private sector to
a desirable policy outcome) are ignored and interpreted as noise. This standard view
of the discipline (Considine, 1994) can be found in many studies (Fenna, 2004; Klein
and Marmor, 2006; Althaus, Bridgeman and Davis, 2013) and is conceptualized as
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the authoritative choice.2
Laing (2015) believes that policymaking behavior can be categorized in three
groups as comprehensive rationality, bounded rationality, and incremental analysis.
Comprehensive rationality indicates that policymaking is based on well-informed and
rational principles, and policymakers are opportunists who seek to maximize utility
and reach most efficient outcomes. This model rests on the “homo economicus”
concept and can better be aligned with earlier branches of the lobbying literature: a
politician tries to maximize his/her benefit subject to norms and rules set out within
his/her closest environment. Actors in this model learn from their mistakes when
making decisions - when they have incomplete information (Dosi and Egidi, 1991;
Ostrom, 2007). This model - although relevant for the purposes of this paper - is
too individualistic and bilaterally constructed to reflect the complex nature of the
lobbying world.
Bounded rationality, on the other hand, contests this view by saying that compre-
hensive rationality is only possible to the extent that politicians have time, resources,
and information, policymakers may be biased in their views. Incremental analysis
appears to offer the most clear picture: policymaking is constrained by practical lim-
itations, and most policy is pragmatic compromise and slow evolution rather than
rational development (ibid.) These views do a better job in explaining the rationale
behind the research question.
3.4 The Influence of Campaign Contributions in the Litera-
ture
This paper looks at two different types of campaign funding to politicians: indi-
vidual and non-individual. Also, an aggregated sum of all funding is provided.
2“Policy-making is purposive, goal-driven and follows distinct steps by authorized actors” (Laing,
2015). In this regard, politicians are viewed as the only authorized people to do so.
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Non-individual funding includes money that comes from political action committees
(PACs), which in turn contain firms, unions, trade associations, and other interest
groups. PACs raise “voluntary” donations from individuals; hence, corporate PAC
contributions come almost entirely from a corporations managers, while union PAC
contributions come almost entirely from their members (Ansolabehere and Snyder,
1998).
The relationship between money and political influence is especially clear from
a rather journalistic perspective, but it is quite hard to document with statistical
evidence because of its complexity. There are two significant problems in this regard.
First, the endogeneity issue constitutes the key problem in this field of research;
donors provide support to members who are sympathetic to their policy positions, yet
investing money in legislators can make them even more sympathetic to their donors.
Thus, contributions may influence votes, but votes may also influence contributions.
In fact, true simultaneity appears when some contributions come before the politicians
vote on a specific bill, and some contributions come after the votes. Second, most
of the studies come with a lack of omitted variables, such as the strength of the
donor group or interest in the legislative districts. This is a significant issue, since
the decision to be made for contributions does not come from a normal distribution,
and groups have already the tendency in the beginning to contribute to “friendly” or
socially powerful legislators (Hendon, 1982; Poole and Romer, 1985).
There is a considerable number of works investigating the relationship between
money and political influence. Lynda Powell’s “The Influence of Campaign Contribu-
tions on Legislative Policy” provides an excellent overview of the literature (Powell,
2014). There are several approaches to studying this relationship. First, some studies
take motives into perspectives and actually question the reason why donors spend
money on politicians without actually investigating how policies are affected by cam-
45
paign money. The second approach looks at the benefits that donors receive from
their campaign investments by using proxies, such as the share value of donors com-
pany, tax reduction or other favorable laws. The third group of research concentrates
on factors that contribute to lawmaking and investigate whether campaign contri-
butions buy politicians time and legislative effort. The fourth approach is based on
perception-oriented surveys and ask politicians about their views on how politically
powerful money is. The fifth and the last group can be categorized as hybrid studies.
Studying financial gains to donations is a type of research favored especially by
economists. These works typically use stock returns as the measure for donation
performance. For instance, Jayachandran (2006) used the change in party majority
control in the US Senate that resulted from Senator Jeffords unexpected party switch
to analyze the market effect of firms in accordance with their donations to the re-
spective political parties. He found out that for every 250,000 USD a firm gave to
the Republicans in the last election cycle, the firm lost 0.8% of market capitalization
the week after the Democrats unexpectedly gained majority control. Similarly, Hall
and Wayman (1990) demonstrated that PAC money buys “marginal time, energy,
and legislative resources that committee participation requires”. The analysis of the
literature by Ansolabehere et al. (2003) indicates that, overall, PAC contributions
show relatively few effects on voting behavior of politicians. Hence, they are not
easily translated into policy influence. A common problem is though the inability to
separate the electoral effect from the influence of donors.
A large subset of the literature deals with the relationship between campaign
contributions and elections; legislators take advantage of contributions to enhance
their electoral prospects and in return they provide their donors with policy influence
(Powell, 2014). The more important a reelection for the politician is (which can be
measured by time the politician spends on campaigning or fundraising), the more
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influential the donors are on his/her legislative decision after the election. Legislators
in a competitive election process will spend more time on their election activities and
hence give more leverage to their donors in gaining policy influence. In addition, fea-
tures of legislatures, such as term limits may affect the relationship between money
and policymaking (ibid.). This paper respects the effects of state-level political vari-
ables and election competition; nevertheless, it also assumes that these effects are (at
least partially) covered by the network design and also state-level fixed effects.
Other academics in the field argue that there is a strong relationship between
the lobbying world and campaign contributions; they work in tandem. This paper
takes on the view that lobbying (in its traditional ad hoc sense) is a way to influence
politicians about policy issues; however, due to a much lower sum of contributions,
its effect is rather miniscule compared to campaign contributions. This view is sup-
ported by some scholars (Calvert, 1985; Austen-Smith, 1993 and de Figueiredo, 2002).
The success of the attempts to quantitatively demonstrate the relationship between
lobbyists and campaign donors has so far been disputed.
Campaign laws can also be significant factors in determining how campaign money
translates into buying political power. An identical campaign finance regulation may
have different effects in different legislatures. Ansolabehere, Snyder and Ueda (2004a,
2004b) looked at the effect of campaign finance regulatory decisions on the stock prices
of firms. They found no effect of laws that restricted or loosened corporate giving on
the share values of corporate donors. Powell indicates that “in general, laws adopted
to limit or ban campaign contributions alter how money flows into politics much more
than they reduce the total inflow” (2014). When certain donation limits are imposed,
independent expenditures may increase. Similarly, low PAC contribution limits can
also be circumvented by bundling individual contributions (Malbin and Gais, 1998).
There are two main views about campaign contributions in the literature: invest-
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ment and consumption. This study views campaign contributions both as a form of
investment and also as a form of consumption or monetary participation in politics.
Donors - especially non-individuals - invest money in politicians so that they fulfill
some of their political expectations; nevertheless, politicians also receive campaign
money to increase their social power in politics in general and thus to survive in the
political world. This act of survival is realized by (i) forming coalitions with other
politicians and leading political fronts and (ii) trying to maximize the agenda power
in the legislature by proposing bills and defending their need to be part of political
discussion. The consumer contributors concept has been proposed by several scholars
in the past (Rosenstone and Hansen, 1992; Verba, Schlozman and Brady, 1995). The
idea behind is that a significant portion of the money in the campaign contribution
system comes from individuals in relatively small sums. However, since each contrib-
utor has a tiny share in political donations, it is likely that they do not expect benefits
in return. Their donation may be related to the consumption value associated with
politics and the people who give money are disproportionately likely to participate in
politics in other ways, including attending meetings, writing letters, talking to others
and voting.
A quite visible result of the literature review on money in politics is that the
scholars look at the contributions coming from different types of donors (individu-
als and non-individuals) using the same scale (without any distinction). Thus, they
do not really look into the difficulty factor of attracting contributions and hence do
not calculate the opportunity cost. In fact, this calculation should be quite signif-
icant, since one estimate is that one hour of a legislators time costs around 10,000
USD (Langbein, 1986). Another factor is that most of the studies assume that the
same campaign dollar buys the same amount of political power in different states.
Stratmann (2004) indicates that in Montana a primetime television spot that reaches
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the entire constituency is less than 100 USD, while the equivalent message would
cost more than 1,500 USD in the Los Angeles area. This has also been taken into
consideration in this paper.
3.5 Research Questions
This paper is an attempt to fill some problematic gaps in the previous literature tak-
ing into account the distinction between individual and non-individual contributors,
the non-bilateral relationship in the money-influence exchange between donors and
politicians, and state-level control variables as an attempt to control the different level
of influence contributions have in different regions. This paper measures the power
output of politicians by their agenda holding power which can be approximated as
the life expectation of a bill proposal. Following hypotheses are investigated:
H1: A larger social network power in campaign contribution networks translates
into higher agenda holding power and therefore a longer life expectation for bill pro-
posals.
H2: Different law categories respond differently to social network power of bill
authors.
3.6 Data
As previously indicated, the analysis includes over 15 million state-level campaign
contribution records captured in the 1989-2017 period. 112,389 winning candidacies
and 187,635 bills proposed in state-level legislatures are taken into consideration. In
addition to social network data, state-level economic variables, and author-specific
legislative and identification variables are used. The law component of the study
specifically looks at author and committee-specific data. The independent variables
are listed below.
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1. Campaign contribution data has been downloaded using webscraping from Fol-
lowTheMoney.org (2017). From this data, donor-to-minister social networks
(bipartite) have been created. The networks have been used to calculate cen-
trality values (significance in the network) for each politician.
2. State local debt per capita. Local debt values and state populations have been
gathered from Census Bureau (2017). New bill proposals may need to take the
level of debt in the state into consideration, hence it must be controlled.
3. State income per capita (FRED Economic Data, 2017). The level of income
in a state may directly (through economic means) or indirectly (through socio-
cultural means) influence the types of bills proposed and how long they stay on
the agenda.
4. Author successful bill count (FollowTheMoney, 2017). Politicians who are suc-
cessful in billmaking may have an easier time holding a bill on the agenda.
5. Author unsuccessful bill count (ibid.). Politicians who are not very skilled or
experienced in maintaining a bill on the agenda may have a more difficult time
in subsequent agenda creation.
6. Committee successful bill count (ibid.).
7. Committee unsuccessful bill count (ibid.).
8. The political identity of the author (categorical). Political identity may affect
the mechanism through which policies are created.
The outcome variable is the number of days a bill stays on the agenda before it
gets accepted or turned down.3
3If the bill has been proposed more than 1.5 years ago and is still in a “pending” situation, it
counts as rejected.
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3.7 Methodology and Descriptive Statistics
This analysis assumes that the world of campaign contributions can be approximated
using a social network with its complex web of dependencies. Connections that the
politicians form with each other in their professional life are affected by factors, such
as seniority, personal relationships, election cycles, state-level political regulations
and many others; yet, the strongest factor that influences their opportunity and/or
consideration to work with other politicians is the bond their donors provide them
as a network template to follow in their professional environment. Politicians who
are invested by the same donor are connected through their contributors taking the
marginally decreasing returns into consideration.4 Stratmann (2004) has found out
that the marginal product of campaign spending is higher in states that limit con-
tributions than in states with unlimited spending. The complex nature of the large
contribution dataset at hand makes it more than difficult to provide an attractive
network visualization.
The paper uses network analysis to extract statistical information that help the
reader to understand the importance of each candidate in the weighted campaign
contribution network: centrality values. Weights are calculated as the logged sum
of contributions5 that politicians receive from a donor in a bipartite network. Nor-
malized betweenness and closeness centrality values are calculated to approximate
different coalition formations in lawmaking. Betweenness centrality6 quantifies the
number of times a politician acts as a bridge along the shortest path between two
4The networks use logged values of the sum of contributions made to a politician by the same
donor.
5Contribution values have been converted to USD value in 2010.
6In the campaign contribution network, the path between two politician is the shortest, when
the number of edges (unweighted network) between two politicians is at a minimum possible value
or the sum of the weights between two politicians (weighted network) is minimized. Betweenness
centrality of a politician is greatest when it stands on the most number of shortest paths between
pairs of politicians in the network.
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other politicians. Hence, it is a good approximation to measure the social power of
politicians who can bring together actors of diverse backgrounds. Closeness central-
ity7, on the other hand, is a measure that represents the proximity of a politician
to others in the bipartite campaign contribution network. Thus, it can more easily
approximate politicians who can be chosen to participate in the sponsorship of a bill
as a committee member.
The analysis uses three different kinds of networks for both the large dataset and
the energy and environment subset: a network each for individual contributions, non-
individual contributions, and all contributions. The purpose here is to look at the
effect of companies and PACs separately to see whether individuals or non-individuals
more strongly influence the agenda holding process in lawmaking.
To test the relationship between network variables and the success of policies, a
Cox proportional hazards model has been used. Cox PH model is a survival model,
in which the unique effect of a unit increase in an explanatory variable is multiplica-
tive with respect to hazard rate. The results for individual, non-individual and all
contribution networks are provided separately in the next section.
Bar graphs on law proposal counts can be found in the figure below. “Energy and
Environment” constitutes the largest group of laws in the dataset. The laws have been
categorized by National Conference of State Legislatures. The number of politicians
in the dataset can be seen in the orange and black bar plots. The orange bar plot
shows the count values for different types of politicians in the dataset, whereas the
black bar plot shows the distribution of highest centrality (top 10) politicians. To
find the highest centrality politicians, a separate network has been created for each
7In the network, one can measure the pairwise distances between one politician and every other
politician by summing the number of edges (unweighted network) or summing the weights of the
edges to those politicians (weighted network). A politician has the highest closeness centrality, when
the sum of pairwise distances between that politician and every other politician is the lowest in the
graph.
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All Politicians
Politicians with Highest Centrality (Top 10)
Figure 3·1: Distribution of Politicians
legislative year and the top 10 politicians who have been found to be among the
ones with highest centrality have been added to an aggregate list. The ratio of high
centrality politicians has been calculated from this smaller subset of politicians. The
count of senate members and governors is considerably higher by ratio in the high
centrality bar plot.
The bivariate plots show the distribution of explanatory and outcome variables
and the relationship between them. The plots on the left come from the large dataset,
whereas the plots on the right show the relationship for a smaller subset of law
proposals - energy and environment law database. Figures below suggests a very
weak relationship between the explanatory and outcome variables in both cases. The
difference between large dataset and the energy and environment subset also seems
to be insignificant.
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Figure 3·2: Law Topics
3.8 Results and Discussion
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All - Individual Contributions Energy and Environment - Ind. Cont.
All - Non-Individual Contributions Energy and Environment - Non-Ind. Cont.
Figure 3·3: Betweenness Centrality and Agenda Length
The quantitative findings of the study indicate that network effects may be sta-
tistically significant, yet they do not have a strong influence on the agenda holding
power of politicians controlling for a set of covariates.8 There is positive correlation
8It has to be mentioned that the study only takes into account the politicians who have won in
the elections and after that who have successfully managed to author a bill. Therefore, there is a
large number of bills not taken into account in the study. Thus, among 187,635 bills, 47,590 bills
constitute the data point count included in the analysis.
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All - Individual Contributions Energy and Environment - Ind. Cont.
All - Non-Individual Contributions Energy and Environment - Non-Ind. Cont.
Figure 3·4: Closeness Centrality and Agenda Length
between higher values of betweenness centrality and the life expectancy of a bill; nev-
ertheless, the sign of the same relationship for closeness centrality is negative. More
importantly, the value of coefficients are on the low-side in all of the cases in the three
models. The biggest absolute value for the centrality coefficient is 0.470. This means
that for a politician that hypothetically has zero (centrality value is 0) social power,
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becoming the most powerful politician (centrality value is 1) in the network makes it
around 1.5 times more likely for the the bill to die. In the case of closeness centrality,
this value is around 0.9 times for all three cases. The results for the survival analysis
have been provided in Tables 1, 2, and 3.
The relationship between the explanatory and the outcome variable is not very
strong. As suggested in the literature section, there is considerable amount of skep-
ticism among academics who say that the relationship between money and influence
may not be that strong (Powell, 2014). In fact - again, as previously indicated -
a potential explanation behind the question “Why is there so little money in poli-
tics?” (especially stressed by Ansolabehere, de Figuieredo and Snyder, 2003) may be
that there may be numerous other mechanisms explaining the influence of organized
groups on politicians.
Hazard ratios have been calculated for non-individual, individual, and all contri-
butions separately. In general, the results show that an increased closeness centrality
corresponds to a lower hazard ratio, whereas betweenness centrality does not provide
any statistically significant result. The hazard ratio graphs are provided below.
Betweenness Centrality Closeness Centrality
Figure 3·5: Non-Individual Contributions, Hazard Ratios
For non-individual contributors - contrary to expectations - it is around 1.5 times
more likely for a network member with the highest network power his/her bill to die
than it is for a network member with the lowest network power. In the case of closeness
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Table 3.1: Survival Model - Non-Individual Contributions
Life Expectation of a Bill
Life in Days
(1) (2)
Betweenness Centrality 0.470∗∗∗
(0.141)
Closeness Centrality −0.103∗∗∗
(0.033)
State Local Debt Per Capita −0.0001∗∗∗ −0.0001∗∗∗
(0.00002) (0.00002)
State Income Per Capita 0.596∗∗∗ 0.598∗∗∗
(0.055) (0.055)
Author Successful Bill Count −0.006∗∗∗ −0.005∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001)
Author Unsuccessful Bill Count 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001)
Committee Successful Avg. Bill Count −0.001 −0.001
(0.0004) (0.0004)
Committee Unsuccessful Avg. Bill Count 0.004∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001)
Author - Democratic −0.031∗ −0.025
(0.017) (0.017)
Observations 47,590 47,590
R2 0.211 0.211
Max. Possible R2 0.999 0.999
Log Likelihood −152,225.500 −152,226.000
Wald Test (df = 76) 6,936.350∗∗∗ 6,938.350∗∗∗
LR Test (df = 76) 11,303.490∗∗∗ 11,302.510∗∗∗
Score (Logrank) Test (df = 76) 10,312.140∗∗∗ 10,311.620∗∗∗
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
58
Table 3.2: Survival Model - Individual Contributions
Life Expectation of a Bill
Life in Days
(1) (2)
Betweenness Centrality 0.227
(0.522)
Closeness Centrality −0.018
(0.025)
State Local Debt Per Capita −0.0001∗∗∗ −0.0001∗∗∗
(0.00002) (0.00002)
State Income Per Capita 0.596∗∗∗ 0.596∗∗∗
(0.055) (0.055)
Author Successful Bill Count −0.005∗∗∗ −0.005∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001)
Author Unsuccessful Bill Count 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001)
Committee Successful Avg. Bill Count −0.001∗ −0.001∗
(0.0004) (0.0004)
Committee Unsuccessful Avg. Bill Count 0.004∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001)
Author - Democratic −0.030∗ −0.029∗
(0.017) (0.017)
Observations 47,590 47,590
R2 0.211 0.211
Max. Possible R2 0.999 0.999
Log Likelihood −152,230.700 −152,230.500
Wald Test (df = 76) 6,929.710∗∗∗ 6,920.670∗∗∗
LR Test (df = 76) 11,293.020∗∗∗ 11,293.380∗∗∗
Score (Logrank) Test (df = 76) 10,303.000∗∗∗ 10,302.970∗∗∗
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 3.3: Survival Model - All Contributions
Life Expectation of a Bill
Life in Days
(1) (2)
Betweenness Centrality 0.057
(0.465)
Closeness Centrality −0.058∗
(0.034)
State Local Debt Per Capita −0.0001∗∗∗ −0.0001∗∗∗
(0.00002) (0.00002)
State Income Per Capita 0.596∗∗∗ 0.594∗∗∗
(0.055) (0.055)
Author Successful Bill Count −0.005∗∗∗ −0.005∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001)
Author Unsuccessful Bill Count 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001)
Committee Successful Avg. Bill Count −0.001∗ −0.001
(0.0004) (0.0004)
Committee Unsuccessful Avg. Bill Count 0.004∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001)
Author - Democratic −0.029∗ −0.028∗
(0.017) (0.017)
Observations 47,590 47,590
R2 0.211 0.211
Max. Possible R2 0.999 0.999
Log Likelihood −152,230.800 −152,229.400
Wald Test (df = 76) 6,929.980∗∗∗ 6,931.920∗∗∗
LR Test (df = 76) 11,292.850∗∗∗ 11,295.720∗∗∗
Score (Logrank) Test (df = 76) 10,302.960∗∗∗ 10,303.890∗∗∗
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
60
Betweenness Centrality Closeness Centrality
Figure 3·6: Individual Contributions, Hazard Ratios
Betweenness Centrality Closeness Centrality
Figure 3·7: All Contributions, Hazard Ratios
centrality, however, for all three cases, the bill is around 0.9 times less likely to die
for the network member with the highest network power. This means that politicians
who are more closely connected to a wider range of campaign contributors may have
a higher agenda holding power. This statistical significance is exciting; nevertheless,
how much of an effect this difference in hazard ratios has in policymaking is open
to debate. The reason behind this inconclusive interpretation is that states have
different laws and session dates; hence, for a more conclusive answer, one should look
at the states - and possibly also the law categories - separately.
As seen in Figure 8 and 9, the results also show that the agenda holding power
(assuming that theoretical expectations about the number of days a bill staying on the
agenda in the legislature is correct) strongly depends on the type of the bill proposed.
In this regard, one can say that there are clearly three clusters of bills:
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1. Bills that stay longer on the agenda and get rejected along the legislative process
and end up with an acceptance rate between 25% to 40% roughly 550 days after
the proposition (the larger group in the middle in Fig. 6).
2. Bills that stay shorter on the agenda, and either get rejected at the beginning
or probably get accepted. In this group the acceptance rate is between 90% and
100%. This second group of bills consist of the following groups: Child Welfare
Enacted, Education, Immigration Enactments, Sentencing and Corrections, Sex
Offender Enactments, State Pretrial Release and State-Tribal. This is group of
bills in the upper edge of the graph.
3. Bills that stay shorter on the agenda and also have a low chance of being
accepted (around 10%). There are only two categories in the third group:
Autonomous Vehicles and Scope of Practice.
The picture of survival rates among the bills may indicate that some issues are
interpreted as valence issues and hence politicians usually share a common preference
about them. In fact, many of the issues in point 2) above - such as child welfare, law
enforcement, and sex offences strongly suggest that. The mechanism for education
and immigration seems to be less clear. Contrastingly, autonomous vehicles is a
highly political topic and one can expect that it has not even had the chance to put
itself to test to be counted a valence issue - therefore, this topic may lead to greater
disagreements among parties of different political orientation and this may result in
early exits out of legislative discussions.
The results show that this paper contributes to the literature in certain ways.
First, the paper reinforces the skepticism in some interpretations of the “money leads
to influence” argument. Second, it expands the campaign contribution literature by
using an extensive dataset and an innovative methodological framework. Third, it
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Figure 3·8: Survival Probability By Party
Figure 3·9: Survival Probability By Law Category
draws attention to the influence of valence issues and position issues - a topic that has
frequently been talked about in the collective action and interest groups literature,
but not as much in the campaign contributions literature.
Analytically, the paper uses the biggest campaign contribution dataset available
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and therefore is not subject to selection bias problem. The high number of observa-
tions in the campaign contribution records dataset (around 15,000,000 points) paves
the way for experimenting with more “sophisticated” methods of classification and
clustering, such as machine learning and deep learning algorithms.
As a whole, this paper can be counted as an exploratory work in the field leading
the reader to question what may be other factors that lead bills to have different life
expectancies. Similarly, a comparative legislative agenda holding study focusing on
Republicans and Democrats can be of great interest to ideology scholars.
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Chapter 4
Political Money and Interests in the USA:
Old and New Stories
Abstract
This paper provides a comprehensive look at the political contributors and lawmakers
in the US. The article uses an extensive dataset on all recorded campaign contribu-
tions between 1989-2017 and state-level laws proposed between 2007-2017. Taking
advantage of several statistical techniques, including network analysis and cluster-
ing, the article attempts to discover what kinds of typological patterns we can observe
among political contributors and lawmakers, both in federal- and state-level. More
importantly, the paper attempts to answer whether the observed patterns show signs
of information that align with public perceptions of political groups in the US. The
paper pays special attention to top 100 federal- and state-level political contributors
and provides anecdotal evidence on their connections. The goal of this work is to
highlight some less known facts about givers and receivers in American politics and
to create a new macro-political perspective about the financing of the politics.
4.1 Introduction
The USA is a politically complex country with numerous political units and sub-units,
such as states and counties, as well as many different systems of laws and regulations
that compete against and complement each other. Being a federal country that has a
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huge population, one can say that the US has a relatively more complex federal system
with 50 states than countries of greater population such as China (34 provinces) and
India (29 states and 7 union territories), but a less complex system than federations
of different nations, such as Russia (22 republics, 9 krais, 46 oblasts, 3 federal cities, 1
autonomous oblast, and 4 autonomous okrugs). The US has 49 bicameral state-level
legislatures and one unicameral legislature (Nebraska).1
Politically, this level of complexity is intensified due to campaign contributions
made by individuals and non-individuals to thousands of lawmakers in the Congress
and state legislatures. To understand the complexity of the system, the paper takes
advantage of social network analysis and machine learning.
There is extremely large data on the contributions made by different entities, as
well as the laws proposed by state-level lawmakers. This article shares the results of
an extensive data collection and provides an insightful summary about the collected
data. The analysis looks at over 15 million records of campaign contributions for
a unique set of 308,122 contributors, 187,616 state-level law proposals and 10,057
state-level law authors. The goal of the paper is to find out what kind of scientifically
old and new stories the campaign contributions and legislative processes can tell the
reader. These stories are about elected and non-elected power holders, groups of
ideologies in the US, and the similarities or differences to what we already know
about the flow of money interests in US politics.
The paper assumes that political contributions and lawmaking are strongly con-
nected. To summarize, political contributions can be seen as a function with a single
(or one-dimensional) input - that is the financial contribution itself - with a multidi-
1The total number of politicians serving in state legislatures is 7383. In terms of number of
politicians per person, there is great variation by state with New Hampshire having 424 state-level
politicians and Nebraska having only 49. Similarly, the ratio of upper and lower houses shows
great variation: There are 16.67 times as many politicians in the lower chamber of New Hampshire
compared to the higher chamber, whereas the same figure for New Mexico is 1.67.
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mensional output, a social and political capital with the power to shape the decisions
of other contributors, as well as all other politicians that the contributor can poten-
tially financially support. In contrast, lawmaking can be seen as a function with a
multidimensional input - the political and financial capital of the law author and the
law committee, several social and demographic variables related to the jurisdiction,
as well as the complex social network of contributions received from various donors.
The output, however, is the law proposal.
The paper starts by providing a literature review on the current research that
characterizes the divisions of and separations between political donors and lawmakers
in the US. This section is followed by the motivation to engage in this work based on
the literature. The data section follows the introductory part. The methodological
approach and the demonstration of quantitative findings are provided in the same
sections. Finally, the paper reflects on what old and new stories the analysis can tell
about American politics.
4.2 Ideological Donors and Motivations Behind Political Giv-
ing
There are two big sources of income for federal- and state-level politicians in the US:
individual, and non-individual (companies, PACs, and unions) donors. The literature
on political giving in American politics mainly deals with five different themes: the
identity of contributors, the identity of politicians who receive contributions, what
contributors want to achieve by political giving, how contributions change the behav-
ior of politicians, and how contributions translate into lawmaking.
An important question in the cross-section of the relationship between politicians
and contributors that is greatly formed by money is why individuals or non-individuals
contribute to politics. The literature proposes a few reasons: attempts to influence
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electoral results (Brown, 2013; Green and Krasno, 1988; Jacobson, 1978), attempts to
influence legislative outcomes (Groseclose and Snyder, 1996; Hall and Wayman 1990;
Powell, 2012), and attempts to receive representative power in legislature (Bartels,
2010; Gilens, 2012). Having influence over politicians may also be strongly attached
to having access; the first example of this literature is by Hall and Wyman (1990)
who found connections between PAC contributions and specific votes by members of
Congress. They claimed that PACs are primarily interested in spending time with
politicians and hence they want to influence the actual process of lawmaking, not only
the final voting process. A similar connection has been demonstrated by Grimmer
and Powell (2013) who indicated that when legislators are unexpectedly removed from
committees, contributions from PACs related to that committees issue area decrease;
thus, the value of a legislator decreases when that person no longer serves the interest
of the PAC in that particular committee.
As Ansolabehere, de Figueiredo and Snyder (2003) indicate, one theory suggests
that contributors wield considerable influence over legislators and even the effects of
the smallest contributions can be felt in the legislation, whereas the contrasting view
suggests that contributors gain relatively little political leverage from their donations.
In fact, since a large portion of the contributions are small and many contributors
do not form any type of collective action, politicians have the incentive not to listen
to them. Tullock (1972) was the first one who claimed that there is little connection
between campaign contributions and legislative behavior: since most firms do not
make any political contributions, their legislative expectation must be very low or
non-existent.
An important part of political giving is the phase of making decisions. There are
two types barriers that can be associated with this phase. First, contributors have
to match themselves with a politician who can serve their political interests. In this
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regard, contributors may consider following factors about a politician before making
an attempt to decide how much they will contribute: incumbency (Jacobson, 2013),
membership within a particular committee (Grier and Munger, 1993; Milyo, 1997),
electoral security (Ansolabehere and Snyder, 2000; Milyo, Primo, and Groseclose,
2000; Welch, 1980), and majority party status (Cox and Magar, 1999; Rudolph, 1999).
Secondly, after a contribution is received, this means that the financial contribution
has to go through the political influence allocation mechanism (or a political capital
function of the politician); thus, the fact that a contribution is made to a politician
does not necessarily mean that this contributor is going have any influence in the
political process. This paper assumes that the number of donors a politician can
appeal to is limited because of the politicians time and political capital; hence, the
distribution of the sums of contributions coming from each donor, and as a contributor
being above the median contributors share is highly important.
Previous research on individual donors show that these donors may have material
or investment-oriented goals, polito-ideological motivations, and exercise solidarity
because of the social aspects of a campaign (Brown, Powell, and Wilcox, 1995; Fran-
cia et al., 2003; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, 1995). Barber et al. (2017) indicate
that ideological factors are not very relevant; however, individuals and non-individuals
from different sectors contribute based on whether a politician sits in a relevant com-
mittee. In the case of PACs, some researchers underline that they have stronger
ideological motivations, because they cannot guarantee that the legislators are going
to work for them. A similar argument is put forward by Poole, Romer, and Rosen-
thal (1987) who demonstrate that advocacy groups donate based on roll-call records
and competitiveness. In comparison, Bonica (2014) provides evidence that individual
donors and PACs have similar motivations and their actions are based on ideological
similarity.
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The flow of interests in the contributor-recipient relationship is not unidirectional
and politicians also make strong attempts to attract contributors. Examples from this
literature are Hassell and Monson, 2014; Bramlett, Gimpel, and Lee, 2011; Gimpel,
Lee, and Kaminski, 2006; Tam Cho and Gimpel, 2007.
American politics scholars have made numerous attempts to identify the differ-
ent types of donors and the political participation behavior of them. The distinc-
tion between donors becomes especially apparent, when the motivations for political
contribution are taken into consideration. Individual donors may usually have ide-
ological, material, and social motivations (Ansolabehere, de Figueiredo, and Snyder
2003; Francia et al., 2003; Gimpel, Lee, and Pearson-Merkowitz, 2008), whereas PACs
may favor incumbency, moderation, and access (Fouirnaies and Hall 2014; Grimmer
and Powell, 2013; Hall and Wayman, 1990; Milyo, Primo, and Groseclose, 2000).
Proposing an innovative argument, Ansolabehere, de Figueieredo, and Snyder (2003)
and Gimpel, Lee, and Pearson-Markowitz (2008) compare an ideologically motivated
individual donor to a consumer, and claim that individuals contribute because they
have a personal utility from participating in politics and merely find satisfaction in
supporting the candidate that they want to see succeed. As will be portrayed in
the upcoming section, there are numerous individual donors who neither have strong
political connections nor the intention to run for an office, but they made themselves
a career by being a donor.
Barber (2016) also indicates that individual donors do not intend to develop a
long-term relationship with candidates and they are not interested in running for
political positions in the future. This behavior may come from the fact that donors
channel their responses to macro-political developments by making local donations
to candidates they know or the candidates of the neighborhoods they are associated
with or live in. Comparably, individual donors are likely aware of the limits of their
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financial power and the very small chance of probability that they will be able to
influence politicians through miniscule sums. In fact, again, as will be shown, a quite
significant portion of the donations made to politicians are in the range of 100 - 200
USD. However, although small in individual sums, the contributions made by the
individuals constitute by far the largest source of political income for legislators.
Previous research on American politics suggests that ideology is still the strongest
factor that influences the decisions of contributors. In fact, several recent studies
have shown that individual donors are ideologically more extreme than their non-
individual counterparts (Bafumi and Herron, 2010; Bonica 2013; Francia et al. 2003).
Additionally, researchers suggest that higher contributions from ideological donors
lead to the selection of certain types of politicians that may ultimately lead to a
stronger political polarization. Barber (2016) argues that individual donors prefer to
support ideologically extreme candidates while access-seeking PACs tend to support
more moderate candidates. He adds that “individuals consistently rank ideological
concerns highly important when deciding where to give”. According to him, there is
a causal relationship between incumbency, ideology, and contributions.
This paper strongly aligns with the view that there are strong connections between
political giving and legislative behavior. The motivations of the smaller contributors
(not only individuals, but also non-individuals) may be ideologically stronger and
more unidirectional, since they are smaller contributors for whom both the political
gains to be made, as well as potential political losses to be endured are much smaller
compared to more significant contributors. Bigger contributors, on the other hand,
may feel the need to contribute to both sides of the political spectrum and hence
be ideologically less motivated. Comparably, the paper agrees with the description
of contributor as a consumer, and argues that small contributions cannot channel
politicians into directions that small contributors want them to follow. Therefore, it
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makes sense to analyze the behavior of bigger contributors; for instance, the top 100
individual and non-individual donors.
4.3 Research Goals
This project is an attempt to contribute to the literature by using quantitative mea-
sures to come up with purely descriptive results that identify types and connections
of contributors and lawmakers in the US. A side-attempt is to shed light on the mo-
tivations of the political donors. This type of work is usually done by scholars from
qualitative tradition who usually undertake extensive fieldwork and in-depth inter-
views. This paper investigates whether it is feasible to come up with comparable
results using statistical techniques. Specifically, the paper attempts to accomplish
three tasks:
1. Give an overview of political contributions and legislation making
2. Provide a quantitative and descriptive network analysis of federal- and state-
level political contributors with an emphasis on the top 100 donors
3. Demonstrate a clustering approach to identify the types of federal- and state-
level contributors as well as state-level lawmakers
4.4 Data
The data used in the paper has been downloaded using webscraping from FollowThe-
Money.org and ncsl.org. The original data from FollowTheMoney.org contained raw
information on political contributions. I used the data that was downloaded to create
five different datasets:
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1. A campaign contribution dataset with over 15 million federal- and state-level
political contributions (FollowTheMoney.org, 2018) 2
2. A candidacy dataset with 112,389 candidacies (ibid.)
3. A political contributor dataset with 308,122 federal- and state-level political
contributors (ibid.) 3
4. A state-level law author dataset with 10,057 authors (National Conference of
State Legislatures and FollowTheMoney.org, 2018) 4
2The variables in the raw campaign contribution dataset include filing jurisdiction, filer of the
contribution, identity of the politician, identity of the candidacy, election status of the candidate,
party of the candidate, election jurisdiction, election year, election type, office sought, incumbency
status, name of the candidate, name of the contributor, type of contributor, specific business and
general industry of the contributor, amount of the contribution, date of contribution, city, state and
zip code of the contributor, employer and occupation of the contributor.
3The political contributor dataset includes name of the contributor, general and specific sector
of the contributor, city, zip code, rural code classification, regional and divisional classification of
the contributor, state, contributor type, candidacy count, Democratic candidacy count, Republican
candidacy count, number of contributions made, number of Democratic contributions made, number
of Republican contributions made, number of losing and number of winning candidacies associated
with the contributor, ratio of winners and losers, number of politicians, number of Democratic politi-
cians, number of Republican politicians, number of politicians who are challengers, who run for open
positions and who are incumbents, sum of contributions, sum of contributions (2010 USD), ratio of
Democratic, Republican, challenger, incumbent and open position politicians, sum of Democratic
contributions, sum of Democratic contributions (2010 USD), sum of Republican contributions, sum
of Republican contributions (2010 USD), sum of contributions made to governors, sum of contribu-
tions made to governors (2010 USD), sum of state-level house and assembly contributions, sum of
state-level house and assembly contributions (2010 USD), sum of state-level senate contributions,
sum of state-level senate contributions (2010 USD), sum of federal-level house contributions, sum
of federal-level house contributions (2010 USD), sum of federal-level senate contributions, sum of
federal-level senate contributions (2010 USD), ratio of contributions made to state-level and federal-
level lower and upper chambers, ratio of Democratic candidacies, ratio of Republican candidacies,
count ratio of Democratic contributions, count ratio of Republican contributions, count ratio of con-
tributions made to governors, count ratio of contributions made to state-level houses and assemblies,
average candidacy contribution (2010 USD), average candidate contribution (2010 USD), average
single contribution (2010 USD), average Democratic candidacy contribution (2010 USD), average
Democratic candidate contribution (2010 USD), average single Democratic contribution (2010 USD),
average Republican candidacy contribution (2010 USD), average Republican candidate contribution
(2010 USD), average single Republican contribution (2010 USD); the date includes normalized, and
normalized and imputed (mean, median, mode) values for all of the variables mentioned above
mainly for clustering purposes.
4The original state-level law database includes variables on: name of law database, subtopic of
law database, bill number, year of bill proposal, bill title, bill status, subtopics of the bill, date of
last action on bill proposal, author of bill proposal, additional authors (committee), summary of bill
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5. A state-level law proposal dataset with 187,616 law proposals (National Con-
ference of State Legislatures, 2018)
The rural codes for zip codes have been obtained from Census.gov (2018) as well
as the regional, and the divisional classifications.
4.5 Descriptive Analysis
The paper assumes that the network influence of political donors (individuals and non-
individuals) come from the politicians that they mutually invest in. A distribution of
the total sum of contributions made by federal- and state-level contributors has been
provided below. The graphs indicate that federal-level contributions are considerably
higher on average and have a more equal distribution. The Gini coefficient for state-
level contributions is 0.0165, whereas it is 0.0583 for federal level contributions. This
issue may result from the fact that the average number of interests is likely much
lower in the states than it is in the federal level; thus, state-level contributors may be
channeling their resources into specific local causes.
Types of contributors seem to be quite differently composed when federal- and
state-level contributions are compared. The non-individuals constitute 8.1% of all
federal-level contributors, whereas the same figure is 17.8% for state-level contribu-
tors. Nevertheless, 59.1% of all federal-level contributions come from non-individuals,
and the same number is 65.4% for state-level contributions; hence, a federal-level con-
tributor’s average input is considerably higher than a state-level contributor’s input.
Also, on the whole, Democratic contributors donate more than Republicans. A short
overview is given below.
proposal, proposal history. The variables that have been created are author success count, author
failure count, author success ratio, author failure ratio, author total bill counter, average life length
of a bill for the author, committee success count, committee failure count, committee success ratio,
committee failure ratio, committee total bill counter, average life length of a bill for the committee,
betweenness, degree, closeness and eigenvector centrality values for the law authors in the bipartite
donor-to-author networks for the year of the bill proposal.
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Table 4.1: Contributions (2010 USD)
Average Avg. Democratic Avg. Republican
Federal 52,919.72 56,689.27 48,122.60
State 13,610.73 15,970.50 10,914.75
Sum Sum Democratic Sum Republican
Federal 3,208,575,570.62 1,997,106,436.21 1,211,005,115.87
State 3,368,548,006.97 2,126,886,662.16 1,240,559,584.39
When the states with the highest contribution averages are compared, an inter-
esting picture appears: the strongest federal-level contributors are from DC and the
closest states, Connecticut, Virginia, and Maryland. This may mean that lobbyists
are the drivers of federal-level contributions. In the state-level, swing states seem to
be powerful actors with four swing states ranking in top 10 states with highest con-
tributions. Possibly, due to higher competition for political power between donors,
the representatives in these states receive higher funding than those in others.
Figure 4·1: Logged Contribution Sums (Highest to Lowest)
The paper pays closer attention to state-level contributions; therefore, the average
contributions by individuals and non-individuals have been calculated for each year
between 1989-2017. The same calculation has been repeated for donor-to-politician
networks for politicians with top 10 highest centrality5. One can see that politicians
5In the state-level donor-to-politician networks, betweennness, closeness, degree, and eigenvector
centralities have been calculated and the politicians have been ranked according to the number of
times they appear among the highest centrality politicians. The politicians who appear the 10 most
number of times have been added to the list.
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Figure 4·2: Contributor Ratios
Figure 4·3: Contribution Sum Ratios
Figure 4·4: Contributor Averages
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Figure 4·5: Total Contributions
Figure 4·6: Sums of Campaign Contributions By Year
with higher centralities receive more funding in general, and especially they receive
higher contributions from individuals. This may mean that popularity may be a big
factor in drawing higher financial contributions. In addition, the cyclical pattern
seems to be relatively stronger for all contributions - compared to top 10 highest
centrality - with years before the election showing higher sums than the rest.
The second largest dataset used in the analysis is the state-level law database pro-
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vided by the National Conference of State Legislatures (2018). On average, Democrats
make a much higher number of bill proposals. The top category for both parties
is ”Energy and Environment”. ”Environmental Health” and ”Elections and Cam-
paigns” come second and third for Democrats, whereas the second and third cate-
gories for Republicans are ”Traffic Safety” and ”Elections and Campaigns”6.
Figure 4·7: Law Proposal Counter By Party
Democrats propose a much higher number of bills than Republicans, yet the ac-
ceptance rate for their bills is quite lower; on the whole, they seem to pass a similar
number of bills. In addition, there is only a few categories that Democrats are able
to pass with a higher percentage than Republicans.
6There is a total of 33 different law categories (databases): Autonomous Vehicles, Campaign
Finance, Child Support and Family Law, Child Welfare Enacted, Collective Bargaining and La-
bor Union, Disability Employment, Early Education and Child Care, Education, Elections and
Campaigns, Energy and Environment, Environmental Health, Ethics and Lobbying, Health Inno-
vations, Healthcare Reform, Human Trafficking Enactment, Immigration Enactments, Initiative &
Referendum, Injury Prevention, Juvenile Justice, Military and Veterans Affairs, Minimum Wage,
Pensions and Retirement, Prescription Drug, Scope of Practice, Sentencing and Corrections, Sex
Offender Enactments, State Economic Development, State Pretrial Release, State-Tribal, Traffic
Safety, Transportation Access and Mobility, Transportation Funding and Finance, Unemployment,
Workforce Innovation and Opportunity Act.
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Figure 4·8: Laws Passed By Party
Figure 4·9: Ratio Difference in Laws Passed
As seen in the figures, Democrats have a higher percentage in passing laws in the
Healthcare Reform, Collective Bargaining and Labor Union, Initiative & Referan-
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dum, State Pretrial Release categories, whereas the Republicans do especially well
in Prescription Drug, Autonomous Vehicles, Scope of Practice, and Transportation
Access and Mobility categories. Another observation is that some law categories are
much more likely to pass through legislature than others: this is especially the case
for valence issues, such as Sex Offender Enactments, Sentencing and Corrections etc.
The descriptive analysis of the contribution and legislation datasets provides two
conclusions that emerge as clear and relatively surprising insights:
1. Republican donors are significantly more powerful than Democratic donors at
the federal-level, whereas Democratic donors are much more powerful in state-
level politics.
2. Republicans propose fewer laws, but they are able to pass a higher percentage
of them than Democrats.
4.6 Network Analysis
The network analysis section of the paper looks at the connections between top 100
federal- and state-level donors. The assumption is that stronger donors give direction
to US politics and make a significant portion of the contributions. The table below
provides information on the ratio of contributions made by top 100 individual and
top 100 non-individual donors. Bearing in mind that there are over 300,000 donors
in the US, especially in the state-level, the contribution of top 100 donors is very
significant, especially in state-level.
Table 4.2: Top 100 Contribution Ratios
Total Individual Non-Individual
Federal 23.10% 9.04% 14.06%
State 58.15% 11.65% 46.50%
The donors are connected through the politicians that they invest in mutually.
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Network maps below show the connections between federal- and state-level donors.
The connections are weighted by the sums of these mutual contributions (2010 USD).
Federal-level networks are much denser than the state-level networks - the number of
overlapping politicians between contributors is much higher. The higher density of
federal-level networks is due to lower number of politicians that are at the national
level of governance; thus, they need to appeal to a higher number of parties and need
to deal with a greater number of issues. The contributors in state-level networks, in
contrast, are more likely work with a lower number of local politicians. The network
graphs below show the connections between contributors from different parties7 and
different regions8.
Network assortativity is a useful tool to understand the preference of actors to
be connected to other actors with similar features; in a nutshell, assortativity is the
correlation between two nodes in terms of their connections to other actors9. There are
four key categorical variables (actor features) in the dataset that can be investigated:
party, region, sub-region, and the general business sector that the contributors belong
to. An overview can be found in Table 3 below.
Table 4.3: Network Assortativity
Party Region Sub-region General Sector
Federal 0.148 -0.021 -0.026 -0.014
State 0.205 0.597 0.594 0.203
7The contributors do not need to provide any party affiliation; nevertheless, the party identity is
identified by the number of politicians invested by the contributor and the amount of contributions
made to politicians from each party. Thus, for instance, if the number of politicians from the
Democratic Party invested by a contributor is greater than the politicians from the Republican
Party invested by the same contributor, the contributor is identified as a Democrat. In cases, when
the politician counts from both parties are the same, the total sum of contributions made to each
party is used to determine the party identity.
8Region groupings are made by the US Census Bureau. The colors purple, black, gray, and yellow
designate Midwest, Northeast, South, and West respectively.
9Assortativity coefficient is the Pearson correlation coefficient of degree between pairs of linked
nodes. Positive values of r indicate a correlation between nodes of similar degree, while negative
values indicate relationships between nodes of different degree. When r = 1, the network is said to
have perfect assortative mixing patterns, when r = 0 the network is non-assortative, while at r = 1
the network is completely disassortative (M.E.J. Newman, 2008).
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Figure 4·10: Federal-Level Networks
Figure 4·11: State-Level Networks
Assortativity values have been recalculated by creating yearly networks and look-
ing at the connections of top 100 individual and non-individual donors in each year.
The results do not look highly different; nevertheless, as Figure 12 shows, it is possible
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to observe strong cycles in each election period.
Figure 4·12: Network Assortativity
Network assortativity figures show a different trend for federal- and state-level
networks, as expected. Federal-level network actors show a tendency to be connected
to their counterparts from the same party; and there is almost no correlation between
coming from the same region or being in the same general sector and connection
preferences in federal-level networks. This is expected, since federal-level contributors
need to appeal to a diverse range of interests, and not necessarily the regional political
representatives. State-level network actors, on the other hand, show a clear preference
to be connected to their regional counterparts, with general sector and party emerging
as features that more weakly describe the connection potential between actors.
As mentioned, political contributors come from 33 different sectors and it is ex-
pected that some of these sectors are politically more active and better-connected
than other sectors. This variation may be due to three factors: these sectors may be
financially more powerful and hence inclined to be more strongly involved in politics
to further expand their financial power, the nature of their sector may make them
dependent on a higher number of political actors10, and part of their business may
be strongly related to government decisions11.
10An example could be insurance companies who work with many different companies at the same
time and therefore need to juggle with benefits and risks related to each sector.
11An example could be airline manufacturers, who produce both commercial aircraft, but also
military aircraft and equipment.
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Figure 13 shows the distribution of top 100 strongest connections. The connections
between two sectors are strong, when the sum of contributions that companies from
these two sectors invest in the same candidates is high. Especially in federal-level con-
tributions, one can see that sectors that can potentially be more strongly influenced
by government decisions are the actors in strongest connections: airline manufactur-
ers, telecommunications, credit unions, and insurance companies. In contrast, in the
state-level networks, the effects of collective action becomes clearer; the sectors who
have stronger connections are lobbyists and unions with lobbyists being significantly
strong. This may point at the fact that state-level players are smaller than their
federal counterparts and hence have to come up with means and organizations to be
politically influential.
Figure 4·13: Share of Strongest Connections Among Sectors
The identities of actors with highest network centralities vary greatly between
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federal- and state-level networks. The strongest players in federal-level networks are
almost always Republican, whereas Democrats and Republicans have a relatively even
share in state-level networks.
Figure 4·14: Federal-Level Top 10 Strongest Actors
4.7 Varieties of Donors
There is significant anecdotal evidence about the involvement of the high centrality
actors in politics. Due to the limited scope of this paper, attention will be paid to
key individuals, some of whom are well-known figures with others contributing to the
US politics without appearing much in the news and media outlets. It is possible to
make two interesting observations related to donors:
1. The donors who are highly influential in the political world are not the ones
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Figure 4·15: State-Level Top 10 Strongest Actors
who are the most influential ones in the financial world; so, their attempt to
gain political influence may have non-political motivations, as well.
2. Most of the top donors choose to invest heavily in both parties - possibly to
maximize their political gain; however, in most cases, it is clear which party
they prefer because of their contribution choices.
Looking at the influential donors, one can see that some of the contributors have
deep political connections. One such state-level contributor is John A. Catsima-
tidis, a New York city billionaire, who has been strongly involved in contributing
to National Republican Congressional Committee, National Republican Senatorial
Committee, Mitt Romney and other important Republicans. Similarly, though, he
has been almost equally interested in supporting Democrats, which is exemplified by
his significant donation to the Clinton Presidential Center and his involvement in
Hillary Clinton’s 2008 campaign by being on her finance team (LittleSis.org, 2018).
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The invitee list to his sister’s wedding in 2011 is an example of the extent of his
political connections: Hillary Clinton, Henry Kissinger, Rudolph Giuliani, Charles
Schumer and others (nypost.com, 2018).
Table 4.4: Federal-Level Individual Donors
Name State Republican Cont. Democratic Cont.
Mark D. Greenberg Connecticut 4,039,617 0
Virginia James New Jersey 314,684.2 0
Table 4.5: State-Level Individual Donors
Name State Republican Cont. Democratic Cont.
John A. Catsimatidis New York 308,461.7 425,765.8
Thomas Coleman Foley Sr. Connecticut 32,750,425 1,500
Gerald J. Ford Texas 1,587,579 749,108.1
Christopher M. Kelly California 0 12,376,856
Orin S. Kramer New York 1,021,677 625,190.72
Robert Price New York 0 46,506.72
Donald J. Trump New York 260,965.5 384,589.2
Tom Foley, a Connecticut businessman, has comparable connections to political
figures. Growing up, his larger social circles included politically influential figures,
such as Bush brothers. Being a graduate of Harvard, Foley first made a career in
the private sector working in companies such as McKinsey & Company and Citicorp
before starting his own investment management company. Foley has also worked as a
bureaucrat and a government contractor by serving as the US Ambassador to Ireland
and also leading efforts to restorate Iraq’s economy after the invasion (ctmirror.org,
2018). This first group of donors can be categorized as ”Elite Network Donors”.
The second group of donors are people who slowly rise up in the hierarchy by
demonstrating various accomplishments in the private and public sector. Orin Kramer
and Robert Price are good examples. Orin Kramer has received a traditionally elite
education at Yale and Columbia Law School and worked for famous consulting and
law firms. He worked as a bureaucrat with Democratic governors in upper-middle
level positions and also has been appointed as member of Advisory Commission of Fi-
nancial Services by President Bill Clinton (observer.com, 2008). Comparably, Robert
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Price, an attorney, investment banker and private sector executive, entered politics
by running campaigns for Congressional politicians in the late 1950s, most impor-
tantly for the New York Governor Nelson Rockefeller. After that, he rose in politics
by serving as a deputy mayor of New York. This group may be called ”Bureaucratic
Donors”.
The last type of donors donors do not have relations that are as strong to the
politicians higher in the hierarchy; nevertheless, the financial power and influence
that they have is quite significant. An example is Gerald J. Ford from Texas; being
son of a farmer, he does not have the same elite education that some other donors
have; however, he made a significant fortune by buying and selling banks and later
on increased his philanthropic activities by being on boards of non-profit institutions,
such as Center for Strategic and International Studies and Cornell Medical College.
Similarly, Christopher Kelly is a former Facebook employee who made a fortune in the
tech sector. Later on, he made several investments in films restaurants, technology
start-ups, and even an NBA team, Sacramento Kings. He is currently involved in
non-profit activities, as well and sits on the boards of Georgetown University and
Progressive Policy Institute among other institutions (LittleSis.org, 2018).
The most well-known member from this latter group is, however, Donald J. Trump.
Initially staying largely out of politics without showing a clear ideological preference,
Trump became involved in politics mostly through donations, but then rose to become
the US President. The political influence of Trump comes mostly from his commercial
connections to companies who are politically important players; for instance, he has
investments in Chevron, ExxonMobil and is friends with Bill Clinton, Carl C. Icahn,
and Roger Stone. This latter group consists of people who become involved in politics
mostly through contributions. These types of donors may be called as ”Commercial
Outsiders”.
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4.8 Network Connections
An interesting aspect of the donor network is that some network actors that do
not score high centrality values are quite well-connected, as one can see in Table 6
and Table 7. For the state-level case, the strongest connections belong to unions
and the lobbying firms. In the case of federal-level networks, unions, but also the
telecommunication companies, such as Comcast and Verizon seem to be quite well-
connected. Honeywell and UPS are quite big players.
A quick look at the profile of politicians these donors invest in reveals that these
actors show much less tendency for partisanship, investing heavily in key political
figures from both Democrats and Republicans. This becomes quite clear, when the
individual recipients of these donors are identified (LittleSis.org, 2018). For instance,
among the top recipients of Honeywell, there is John McCain with 39,100 USD and
Barack Obama with 19,500 USD, the rest of the list is quite diversified in terms of
partisanship, as well. Comcast is in a similar position with significant contributions
to Barack Obama and Mitt Romney (236,300 USD and 142,500 USD respectively).
Verizon seems to be a little more partisan with major contributions going to the Re-
publican Party; yet, it supported Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton, as well (ibid.).
On the whole, the strength of network connections between these actors seem to be
more strongly related to their diverse political interests and efforts to appeal both
sides of the politics.
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4.9 Clustering: Donor and Lawmaker Typology
This section of the paper focuses on what kind of old and new stories the data tells
us in terms of categorizing donors and lawmakers. As previously indicated, both
contribution and the legislature datasets have a large set of variables that one can
use to create an identity for individuals and non-individuals in these groups. In this
regard, there are two sets of variables that are clearly distinguishable in each dataset:
ideological and non-ideological. Since clustering algorithms have the tendency to
group observations according to where they differ the most from each other, it may
be useful to compare the results that clustering algorithms give using 1) the full range
of variables in the datasets, and 2) only the non-ideological range of variables.
To perform clustering on these large datasets, Calinski-Harabasz and Silhouette
Index values have been calculated to determine the optimal number of clusters. Sim-
ilarly, distance-based algorithms (such as kmeans++) and density-based algorithms
(such as DBSCAN ) have been applied. Finally, Calinski-Harabasz and kmeans++
have been used due to lower need for memory. At the very end, however, 10 has been
chosen as the number of clusters to provide a large enough number to differentiate
between potential groups of donors and lawmakers, and small enough to have an
overall picture. Before running the clustering algorithms, variables have been nor-
malized and missing variables have been replaced with mean values of that variable.
Six different sets of data have been used for clustering:
1. Federal-level contributors, all variables
2. Federal-level contributors, non-ideological variables
3. State-level contributors, all variables
4. State-level contributors, non-ideological variables
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5. State-level lawmakers, all variables
6. State-level lawmakers, non-ideological variables
The clustering results indicate that the party lines are still the strongest factors
that separate political contributors and lawmakers from each other. The effects of
party separation still seem to be strong, when non-ideological set of variables are
used in the clustering. The second factor of separation is success: in the case of
contributors, some clusters are formed by the choices of contributors to invest in
winning or losing politicians. In the case of lawmakers, the non-ideological clusters
are mostly separated by the ratio of successful vs. unsuccessful lawmakers.
The results of the clustering reinforce the theme of an old story: ideology is the
strongest factor that divides political stakeholders in the US. In fact, when categori-
cal variables (such as region, sector of the contributor, and law database category) in
both datasets are taken into consideration, there is very little to no sign of differenti-
ation between clusters with regard to these factors. An attempt to identify different
stakeholders has been made and below you can find a list on results of the cluster-
ing. The findings indicate that further work in this regard may be needed, since the
identities of the stakeholders in different clusters are far from being parsimonious.
The graphs that provide a summary of the clustering results can be found in the
supplementary materials to the dissertation.
Federal-Level, all variables
• Clusters are defined by party ideologies only; hence, there is no need to mention
them explicitly.
Federal-Level, non-ideological variables
• Retired people and lobbyists who from everywhere who support winners and
losers
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• Republican lobbyists from swing South
• Big Republican contributors and small Democratic contributors from everyh-
where who invest in losers
• Democratic and Republican lobbyists from swing South
• Democratic uncoded people from Northeast and South
• Republican lobbyists from swing South and the West
• Big Republican and small Democratic contributors, lobbyists and retired people
from the South who invest in losers
• Democratic lobbyists from the South who invest in losers
• Democratic lobbyists from the South
• Republican lobbyists from the South
State-Level, all variables
• Clusters are defined by party ideologies only; hence, there is no need to mention
them explicitly.
State-Level, non-ideological variables
• Uncoded Democrats and Republicans from the South (NJ, TX, NC) who invest
in losers
• Democratic lobbyists and uncoded contributors from the South (VA, FL)
• Uncoded contributors from the Northeast and the South (NY, NJ, CT, FL)
• Uncoded Democrats from Northeast and the South (CT, FL, NJ, NC) who
invest in losers
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• Uncoded contributors from the South (FL) who invest in losers
• Uncoded Democratic contributors from the South (NC, FL) who invest in win-
ners
• Lobbyists and uncoded contributors from the South (FL, NC, VA)
• Lobbyists and uncoded Democrats from the South (FL, NC, CO, VA) who
invest in winners
• Uncoded Democrats from the Northeast and the South (NJ, NC, CO, DC) who
invest in losers
• Uncoded contributors from NC and FL who invest in losers
Lawmakers, all variables
• Clusters are defined by party ideologies only; hence, there is no need to mention
them explicitly.
Lawmakers, non-ideological variables
• Unsuccessful lawmakers from FL, TX, MO
• Democratic lawmakers from MI
• Successful lawmakers from LA, CA, VA
• Successful Republican lawmakers from AR, UT, SD
• Unsuccessful lawmakers from CT, ME, IA
• Unsuccessful lawmakers from WV, NH, WI
• Unsuccessful Republican lawmakers from PA, MO, MS
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• Successful lawmakers from PA, IL, MI
• Unsuccessful Democratic lawmakers from MA, NY, CO
• Unsuccessful lawmakers from NC, MT, MS
The results above show that the strongest factor that separates contributors and
lawmakers from each other among a set of other possible categories (region, sector,
network centrality in the lobbying world, being an individual or a non-individual) is
the ideology. And when ideology is taken into account, the divisions between clusters
become much sharper.
Contrastingly, when ideology is excluded - as seen with the non-ideological set of
variables - the divisions become much less clear. In the case of federal- and state-level
contributors, the ratio of winners and losers (politicians who are able to pass bills and
who are not) seem to be the second strongest dividing factor. The same result is even
more significantly true for the clustering of lawmakers using the non-ideological set
of variables: the strongest separating factor is the ratio of successful politicians in a
cluster.
4.10 Conclusion
This paper is an attempt to accomplish multiple tasks about the world of contributors
and lawmakers in the US at the same time. Some of the findings are not new, hence
they provide an old story, and some of the findings are not old, so they tell a new
story.
The old stories point to ideological differences in the US. The strongest binding
factor between donors and recipients is ideology. Regional and sectoral connections
between donors are significantly weaker. Another old story is that Republicans are
much stronger in the federal contribution world, whereas Democratic donors dominate
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the state system. Lobbyists and retired people constitute the largest politicized groups
in the US who appear in every part of political giving.
The new stories in the paper mostly focus on the strong actors in the Ameri-
can lobbying world. The absolute power of these actors is by far not as high as the
wealthiest and the most powerful individuals and institutions in the US; nevertheless,
their network power provides them great political capital. Defense and telecommu-
nications companies are such examples. The network analysis also reveals strong
individual actors, the identities of whom are not well-known by the American public.
The new questions that arise following the analysis of political donors and con-
tributors require as much (if not more) attention than the original intention of this
research: Why do some actors become politically involved and other economically
equally powerful actors do not? How does the ”consumption behavior” perpetuate
itself even though the gains these actors may make are not highly significant? And
- as previously asked in the literature - why is there so little money in American
politics?
97
Chapter 5
Conclusion
The results obtained from three different papers do not provide a summarizing ar-
gument about the flow of money and interests in general. Nevertheless, the work
as a whole gives three key insights about the use of quantitative methodology in
policymaking literature.
First, the data at hand shows that network studies and dimension reduction of
various kinds can be successfully applied to various fields in policymaking. As in many
scientific fields, there is great emphasis on statistical significance in the policymaking
and political science literature. Nevertheless, the importance of p-values decreases,
as the size of data grows: with “big data” it is relatively easy to have statistically
significant results, even if marginal effects are not as large. In these cases, dimension
reduction may be fruitful. Similarly, in a campaign contribution or a legislation
dataset, a big proportion of the variables come from data sources, the distributions
of which can easily be assumed to be the same. Here, one can more easily apply
clustering techniques by making various statistical assumptions.
Second, the fact that statistically significant results have been obtained in the
first two papers might be an important signal for further research in this field. For
instance, since there is abundant data especially in social media, one may consider
collecting information from a larger set of elite actors with different professions and
compare the results to those at hand. Another approach might be collecting extensive
data from many people who are physically closer to each other, e.g. from the same
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country. Here, it may be more feasible to make the argument that they indeed have
real connections.
A final insight gained in this study is the absolute necessity of the automation
of data collection and analysis procedures in social sciences. Especially with regard
to social data, the automation and analysis of large datasets is largely dominated
by companies. Academic production largely happens through individual efforts of
data collection, data cleaning, and analysis. Creation of a common framework and
common platforms - either as stand-alone software or in cloud - may greatly help
computational social scientists to be more productive and focus on the essence of
their substantial research interests in the future.
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